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ABSTRACT
Much of the discussion of German National Socialism has historically
focused on of Adolf Hitler as the architect of the Nazi state. While recognizing
Hitler’s central role in the development of National Socialism, this thesis contends
that he was not a lone actor. Much of the ideological and structural development
National Socialism was driven by senior individuals within the party who were
able to leverage their influence to institutionalize personal variants of National
Socialism within broader party ideology. To explore the role of other ideologues
in the development of Nazi ideology, this thesis examines how Hitler’s leadership
style perpetuated factionalism, how when and by whom central elements of Nazi
ideology were introduced, as well the ideological sources from which these
concepts were adapted. After the party’s ultimate rise to power Hitler, always
centrally positioned, eliminated internal competition and institutionalized his own
variant of National Socialism whilst co-opting the concepts and structures
developed by other ideologues that offered useful tools to pursue his goals.
Through this analysis, this thesis seeks to demonstrate how the foundational
elements of National Socialism took form, even before the party achieved power,
and how these elements were subsequently utilized to consolidate Nazi control
over the German state. Above all else, this thesis sheds much-needed light on
the pivotal role of individuals and the conflict between them that engineered the
cataclysm of the Third Reich.
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INTRODUCTION:
Despite the rich corpus of literature pertaining to the Nationalsozialistische
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP), insufficient attention has been paid to the role
of the ideologues surrounding Hitler in the party’s evolution. This study argues
that Nazism began as one of many thin-centered populist parties in 1919 and
thickened under the influence of the party’s competing Munich and Strasserite
wings until 1933. Once the Nazis entered power, the party’s ideology
consolidated around Hitler and became an instrument of his will. Although Hitler’s
role in the party’s ideological thickening was crucial, he was not a lone actor in
the development of National Socialism and his dominance over the party only
became absolute late in its development.
To understand the ideological development of National Socialism from its
thin-centered populist origin, this thesis explores the contributions of several
actors, both proceeding and surrounding Hitler, who played critical roles its
evolution. Only by going back to the beginning of Nazism and tracing its
development forward, can we clearly understand how the ideology came to
become so single-mindedly militant. Hitler’s Reich was not built in a day, it was
the culmination of over a decade of radicalization in the populist völkisch
movement. The bulk of Chapter 1 is dedicated to the review of literature relevant
to the concepts of thin and full ideology, populism, and fascism. The chapter
concludes with a brief analysis of Hitler’s personalist and often indirect leadership
style that provides a framework for and understanding of his role in the evolution
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of Nazi ideology. Chapter 2 explores the revolutionary turn in völkisch populist
politics during the early Weimar period that gave birth to the Nazis and examines
their rise to dominance over the völkisch movement. Chapter 3 traces the
genesis of Nazism’s ideological thickening through the adaptation of racial
nationalist, corporatist, and socialist themes found within the party’s early Munich
wing. The chapter subsequently examines how the Munich Wing came to focus
on racial nationalist concepts to the exclusion of others and, in the process,
created the future Third Reich’s penultimate foundational concept of the völkisch
state. Chapter 4 analyzes the expansion of Nazism’s socialist and corporatist
concepts rooted in the party’s Strasserite wing, as well as the role played by
conflict between Munich and the Strasserites in driving the party’s ideological
evolution. As a result of this conflict, the Strasserite wing asserted itself as the
dominant wing of the party for a time and used this dominion to create a highly
organized party apparatus that formed the basis of one of Nazism’s earliest and
most potent tools of social control. Chapter 5 examines the central tenants of
racial purity, conquest, and economic autarky in Hitler’s personal variant of
National Socialism. Finally, Chapter 6 examines how Hitler solidified his grip over
the party through a series of purges and institutionalized his own variant of
National Socialism in the process; paradoxically, briefly thinning the ideology
once again as a result.

2

CHAPTER ONE:
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The Theory of Thin-Centered Ideology
The theory of thin-centered ideology originates with Michael Freeden’s
efforts to examine the late twentieth-century emergence of ideological
movements such as feminism and the Greens, which sprang from single-issue
cores and subsequently, expanded by borrowing extensively from other
ideologies.1 Freeden additionally seeks to explain the durability and adaptability
of the venerable ideology of nationalism; which, despite its nebulous nature, has
either influenced or appeared as a major component in ideologies across the
political spectrum for at least two centuries. Full ideologies, such as liberalism or
socialism attempt to provide a comprehensive platform addressing all pressing
socio-political challenges facing a specific society. Conversely, thin-centered
ideologies are constructed around “a restricted core attached to a narrower range
of political concepts” that are either incapable of covering the full political
spectrum or make no effort to do so.2
Thin-centered ideologies can remain thin in the form of single-issue
protest parties or as a sub-component within other ideologies, or they can
“thicken by ingesting the patterns of other ideologies” and emerge as full

1

Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1996), 486.
2 Michael Freeden, “Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?,” Political Studies, 46: 4 (1998), 750.
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ideologies in their own right.3 Because of their restricted core, thin ideologies
such as nationalism or populism are able to combine with other thin and full
ideologies such as communism, socialism, and ecologism, without difficulty.4 This
process of combination and ingestion of other ideologies is the key to
understanding the adaptability of thin ideologies, such as populism globally, and
is paramount to evaluating the evolution of National Socialism in particular. The
concept of thickening offers a framework for closely analyzing how an ideology
develops by reconfiguring concepts scavenged from others. As will be explored
in greater detail in Chapters 3 and 4, the NSDAP originated as a populist party,
and thickened by ingesting concepts from other, ideologies such as nationalism,
socialism, and corporatism.
The concept of thickening within a thin-centered ideology presents a
promising framework for analyzing the evolution of an ideology such as National
Socialism, but there are limitations in the theory as it currently exists that this
study seeks to resolve. First, it creates the illusion of unity and linearity in
ideological development. Ideologies are not homogeneous entities; they are
umbrellas for diverse sets of related ideas and practices centered around core
concepts. By focusing excessively on the macroscale development of an
ideology, it is easy to miss the fractious internal divisions within it that can lead
the evolution of an ideology in any number of unpredictable directions. Second, it

3
4

Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 485.
Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” Government and Opposition 39, no. 4 (2004): 544.

4

neglects the crucial role of individuals in driving the thickening process.
Ideologies are the creation of men and women. Attempting to understand how
ideologies develop without analyzing the role of the individuals who drive such
development is doomed to be incomplete.
The solution to this challenge is not to dispose of the concept of thickening
itself, but to refocus it on the role of individuals in an ideology’s development.
Ideologies do not develop of their own accord; they develop because of the
actions of people. The process of combination and ingestion occurs at the level
of the individual.5 Adherents of an ideology create their own variant of it by
incorporating concepts from other ideologies. This is a process of ideological
mutation, and most of these mutations exert little influence on the thickening
process of an ideology. However, influential individuals such as party leaders,
organizational chiefs, theorists, and propagandists, contribute to an ideology’s
thickening process by institutionalizing their personal variants. Thus, in order to
fully understand an ideology’s thickening process, it is necessary to analyze how
core elements of the ideology were introduced, who introduced them, and the
sources these concepts were adapted from. Moreover, it is equally important to

5

Although structuralist perspectives have utility, the leading role of individuals in political decision
making and in major historical events should not be underestimated. As the prominent Neorealist
scholar Kenneth Waltz explored at length, individual human behavior forms the first “image” of
international relations. Political structures are significant, but idiosyncrasies and preferences at
the level of the individual drive political decision making. The role of individuals in the process of
ideological thickening that I propose in this thesis, is a direct extension of Waltz’s logic into the
realm of the history of ideology. For a fuller discussion of the role of individuals in international
relations, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A theoretical Analysis (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2001).
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analyze concepts that were influential during an ideology’s formative years that
were subsequently eliminated or altered due to internal factional or personal
rivalries. Ideological thickening does not predict a forgone conclusion. Individuals
and groups determine the course of this process through their actions and power
struggles. The inner workings of this process in the case of National Socialism
will be explored at great length in Chapters 3, 4, and 6.

Populism as a Thin-Centered Ideology
Before we can meaningfully analyze the populist origins of the Nazi party,
it is necessary to clearly define the frequently imprecisely employed concept of
populism. In his 2004 article, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” Cas Mudde laid the
foundation for the current consensus of populist studies by applying Freeden’s
theory of thin-centered ideology to populism. Mudde argued that due to its thincenter, populism can combine with a wide range of thin and full ideologies across
the political spectrum, thus accounting for tremendous variability between
individual populist parties.6 In Mudde’s model, “populism is moralistic rather than
programmatic.”7 The programmatic objectives of populist parties are determined
individually in each party by their thickening processes and thus any search for
pan-populist programmatic cohesion is a red herring. The core of populism lies in
the ideology’s central moralistic discourse pitting the “the pure people” against

6
7

Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” 544.
Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” 544.
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“the corrupt elite” and arguing that politics should express the will of the people.8
The people are in turn portrayed as a homogeneous group, closely tied to the
nation’s “heartland,” which is itself an imagined community wherein a “virtuous
and unified population resides.”9 The implication of the populist discourse is that
an entire nation could or would mirror the idealistic heartland without the
meddling of ‘the corrupt elite.’ In this narrative, the “corrupt elite” and the
established political parties they represent are cast as betrayers of the will of the
people. Therefore, the only way to protect the purity of the people and the
sanctity of the heartland is to reinstitute the will of the people via radical populist
reforms within the system.
Ben Stanley has taken Mudde’s scholarship a step further by defining the
fundamental conceptual core elements of populism as:
•

The existence of two homogeneous units of analysis: ‘the people’
and ‘the elite.”

•

The antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite.

•

The idea of popular sovereignty.

•

The positive valorization of ‘the people’ and the denigration of ‘the
elite.’10

8

Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” 543.
Mudde, following the lead of Paul Taggart uses the term heartland; but fatherland, motherland,
and homeland can all be used interchangeably to describe the same phenomena in populist
discourse. See Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” 545-546.
10 Ben Stanley, “The Thin Ideology of Populism,” Journal of Political Ideologies 13, no. 1 (2008):
102.
9
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Stanley argues that these four core elements serve an “ideational rather than
structural role in populism.”11 While the structure of a populist movement can
assume any number of configurations, these four core elements impart a
distinctly populist discourse that underpins all populist parties. If we accept that
all manifestations of populism share these core conceptual elements, then what
accounts for this fundamental ideological cohesion across populist movements?
Unlike full ideologies such as socialism or liberalism, or other thin ideologies such
as feminism or nationalism, populism lacks foundational texts along the lines of
Das Kapital or The Wealth of Nations, or even iconic leaders who embody
populist thought across the international stage. Stanley argues that the answer
lies in the very concept of popular sovereignty itself. Thus, a populist party can
legitimate itself in any configuration as long as it is able to successfully portray
itself as an executor of the will of the people.
Stanley bases his argument on Margaret Canovan’s principle that the
concept of popular sovereignty constitutes the “foundational myth” of modern
representative politics, and that democracies are inherently divided between
“pragmatic” and “redemptive” faces.12 The pragmatic face recognizes democracy
as a means to peacefully mediate the competing interests of the electorate; while
the redemptive face seeks to utilize democratic institutions to lend popular
sovereignty a tangible form.13 Although these faces frequently clash, their
Stanley, “The Thin Ideology of Populism,” 95.
Stanley, “The Thin Ideology of Populism,” 101.
13 Margaret Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy,” Political
Studies 47, no. 1 (1999): 9.
11
12
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presence and interdependence is necessary for the existence of functional
democracy. This is why despite the absence of foundational populist texts or
thinkers, populism enjoys such prevalence across the democratic West.
Populism is endemic to the concept of popular sovereignty itself and only needs
a crisis catalyst, or the perception of excessive pragmatism suppressing the will
of the people to mobilize it as a political ideology.14
The limitation of this consensus lies in its assumption that populists
inherently remain reformist. The model is blind to the prospect of a populist
movement becoming revolutionary as part of its thickening process. The
possibility that a populist movement could fuse its moralistic discourse and
fixation on enforcing popular sovereignty into an anti-democratic ideology is
categorically overlooked. This is precisely what occurred in the case of the Nazi
party. It began as one of many populist parties in the early Weimar Republic, and
ideologically thickened by absorbing diverse elements from existing racist,
corporatist, and socialist ideologies to become a totalitarian ideology that
continued to perceive itself in populist terms. In Nazism, the will of the party, and
ultimately the will of the Führer became conflated with and a proxy for the will of
the people. In order to understand how this conflation transpired, it is necessary
to turn our attention to the rich field of comparative fascism.

14

Stanley, “The Thin Ideology of Populism,” 102.
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Historical Perspectives on Fascism and National Socialism
In any exploration of fascism, it is important to begin by noting that, much
like populist parties, there is significant variation in the programmatic aims of
fascist parties. Unlike Marxist-Leninism, Stalinism, or Maoism that – despite
regional variation – ultimately derived from expansions of classical Marxism,
fascism was constructed and sustained from a diverse range of ideological
trends stemming from both the left and right. Even the fascist parties of Europe
themselves proved unable to define “universal fascism” due to irreconcilable
ideological differences over racial politics and state structure during the first
meeting of the Fascist International in 1934, and this problem has also vexed
subsequent generations of historians.15 John Lukacs has gone so far as to
question the validity of applying the umbrella term “fascist” to movements as
diverse as the NSDAP, Partito Nazionale Fascista (PNF), and Action
Française.16 Despite the challenges facing the field, the works of Sternhell,
Mosse, Payne, and Weber have served to bring conceptual clarity to the implicit
problems of defining fascism. Throughout this study, National Socialism will be
regarded as a member of the fascist family, as it clearly satisfied Payne’s

Stanley Payne, “Fascist Italy and Spain, 1922-1945,” Mediterranean Historical Review 13, no.
1-2 (1998): 105.
16 John Lukacs, The Hitler of History, New York: Vintage Books, 1997, 33. Lukacs contends that
the unifying thread between Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany was populism not
fascism. Lukacs’s analysis of Hitler as a populist who united concepts of nationalism and the
people as a central pillar of his policy and propaganda is insightful as a means to understand how
Hitler cultivated his populist mystique in Weimar politics, but it sheds little light on the deeper
nature of fascism. Lukacs’s parallel contention that German and Italian fascism were
incomparable during the timeframe is unconvincing compared to the deeper treatments of the
subject by Weber and Payne. See Lukacs, The Hitler of History, 108, 118.
15
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typological description of fascism discussed below. The specific distinctions
between ‘generic’ fascism and National Socialism will be addressed in greater
detail at the end of this chapter.
Stanley Payne’s typological description of fascism details thirteen points,
divided into five categories - ideology and goals, negations, style, and
organization - that constitute the basis of fascism as a political phenomenon.17 In
Payne’s model, the ideology and goals of fascism revolve around the “espousal
of an idealist, vitalist, and voluntaristic philosophy” that seeks to “realize a new
modern, self-determined, and secular culture.”18 To achieve these revolutionary
goals, fascism attempts to construct a nationalist authoritarian state that rejects
traditional models in favor of a corporatist social and economic structure.
Furthermore, fascism positively evaluates the use of force both as a means to
achieve its domestic aims and on the international stage, as it seeks a “radical
change in the nation’s relationship with other powers.”19 In addition to its
revolutionary agenda, fascism views itself as antiliberal, anticommunist, and
anticonservative. These negations do not preclude alliances of convenience, but
fascism remains hostile to all established political trends nonetheless. 20

17

For the original thirteen points, see Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism 1914-45 (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 7. Payne notes that these thirteen points provide guideline
to common characteristics of fascism, but a small degree of divergence should be expected when
analyzing specific movements. As with any ideology, individual examples can stray from the
model on one or two points, while still conforming to the ideal type. See Payne, A History of
Fascism, 6-7.
18 Payne, A History of Fascism, 7.
19 Payne, A History of Fascism, 7.
20 Payne, A History of Fascism, 11.
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Finally, fascist movements are characterized by a distinct style and
organization, including:
•

“Attempted mass mobilization and militarization of political
relationships and style”

•

“Emphasis on aesthetic structure of meetings, symbols, and
political liturgy, stressing emotional and mystical aspects”

•

“Extreme stress on the masculine principle and male dominance,
while espousing a strongly organic view of society”

•

“The exaltation of youth above other phases of life”

•

“A specific tendency toward an authoritarian, charismatic, personal
style of command”21

The influence of style and organization on the political behavior of fascist
movements should not be underestimated. Fascist efforts to achieve popular
mass mobilization and the appeal to youth mirror those of other revolutionary
traditions, particularly Marxist-Leninism. Fascism, however, takes the appeal to
youth a step further and exalts youth above all other stages of life, to the point
that generational conflict becomes a touchstone of fascist ideology.22 The
primacy placed on the aesthetic structure of meetings and the use of political
liturgy and symbols as sacred manifestations of party ideology highlights the
undercurrents of “civic religion” that is fundamental to the form and function of

21
22

Payne, A History of Fascism, 7.
Payne, A History of Fascism, 13.
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fascism.23 Likewise, the obsession with the militarization of political relationships
combined with the lionization of conflict as a tool of both political legitimation and
state policy lends fascism a distinctly hyper-militarized political culture. Although
the use of violence for the purposes of revolution is not unique to fascism, the
concept that perpetual violent struggle is beneficial for the health of society
distinguishes fascist political violence from that of prior revolutionary ideologies.24
Finally, the authoritarian, personalist nature of the fascist leadership principle
serves to create miniature autocracies at all levels of society from the highest
military and civilian bureaucracies, to the lowest local administrations.
Payne’s typological approach provides a useful set of heuristics for
identifying fascist movements, but to understand fully the ideology, it is
imperative to explore its partially left-wing roots. Fascism was not a manifestation
of right-wing reactionary politics. Although fascist and reactionary interests
frequently ally to challenge existing institutions, these were merely alliances of
convenience. Inevitably, whichever faction - be it reactionary or fascist ultimately prevails either would turn on their erstwhile allies or sideline them into
irrelevancy.25 For its part, fascism has historically perceived itself as neither left
nor right, but as a ‘third way’ between democratic liberalism and Marxist
socialism. Fascist movements, therefore, see themselves in revolutionary terms;
despite allusions to historical legitimacy, they have no interest in turning back the

23

Payne, A History of Fascism, 9, 12.
Payne, A History of Fascism, 11.
25 Eugen Weber, Varieties of Fascism (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1964), 141.
24
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clock of progress, but rather in the radical socio-political restructuring of society
to match an ideological agenda.26 In this, the revolutionary ambitions of fascists
are no less radical than their Marxist adversaries. Indeed, their aims are so
similar because they shared a common ideological genesis.
Zeev Sternhell masterfully identifies fascism as a synthesis of radical
nationalism and anti-Marxist socialism.27 On one hand, fascist movements define
themselves in nationalistic terms and are exceedingly aggressive towards rival
foreign states and groups identified as alien within the nation. On the other, they
pursue radical social reforms intended to create social peace through the
dissolution of all boundaries between citizens of the nation. In essence, fascists
adapted traditional socialist precepts of proletarian solidarity redefining them in
national terms. This entire ideological endeavor is underscored by four overriding
principles:
•

That all challenges facing modern society were the result of materialism;
and that liberalism, democracy, and Marxism were all irrevocably
materialistic.

•

The rejection of individualism and the adoption of national collectivism
intended to create social harmony through the elimination of social
divisions.

•

The state as the ultimate expression of the national collective.

Zeev Sternhell, “Fascism,” in Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspectives, ed. Constantin
Iordachi (New York: Routledge, 2010) 55.
27 Sternhell, “Fascism,” 55.
26
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•

The supremacy of politics over economics.28
In light of these principles, Sternhell argues that fascist ideology is

inherently totalitarian, and perhaps the “purest example of a totalitarian ideology”
that has ever existed.29 In fascism, citizens are not only required to acquiesce to
the new order; they are expected to participate enthusiastically and fully
internalize the ideology’s revolutionary aspirations. The entirety of society must,
by necessity, be harmonized into the state collective; there could be no division
or intermediary between a citizen and their national identity. In the words of
Giovani Gentile and Benito Mussolini, there can be: “no individuals or groups
(political parties, cultural associations, economic unions, social classes) outside
the State.”30 French fascist Marcel Déat further described the objective of this
harmonization as, “the total man in the total society, with no clashes, no
prostration, no anarchy.”31 Despite the ideology’s totalizing aspirations, it is worth
noting as Payne and Mosse have, that in practice, fascist governments have
typically failed to achieve the centralization and bureaucratization necessary to
enforce complete totalitarianism within their borders.32

Sternhell, “Fascism,” 55-56, 58.
Sternhell, “Fascism,” 58.
30 Benito Mussolini and Giovanni Gentile, The Doctrine of Fascism (Florence: Vallecchi
Editore,1932), 11. Quoted in Sternhell, “Fascism,” 58. The totalitarian aspirations of fascism are
apparent throughout The Doctrine of Fascism, but are best captured in the following quote;
“Fascism, is totalitarian, and the Fascist State - a synthesis and a unit inclusive of all values interprets, develops, and potentates the whole life of a people.” Mussolini and Gentile, 11.
31 Marcel Déat, qtd. Sternhell, 58.
32 Payne, A History of Fascism, 10; See also George L. Mosse, “Towards a General Theory of
Fascism,” in Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspectives, ed. Constantin Iordachi (New York:
Routledge, 2010) 64.
28
29
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On its surface, the unconcealed totalitarianism of fascism may seem so
antithetical to Western liberalism as to be beyond understanding. How could the
citizens of any society willingly surrender their individual political franchise to
partake in a totalitarian system? Why did many citizens of fascist states not see
themselves as oppressed? In short, the slide into fascism was far less dramatic
than it appears on its surface. As Sternhell deftly explains, fascism emerged from
established pre-existing trends within European politics, and its ideological
foundations, in fact, predated World War One.33 Consequently, fascism bases its
legitimacy on foundational principles shared in common with its liberal
democratic and Marxist socialist rivals. In light of this, it is essential to note that
despite its totalitarian foundation, fascism did not reject fundamental Western
conceptions of popular sovereignty – instead it created a peculiarly fascist reimagining of popular sovereignty within a collectivist lens.34 In order to properly
understand this transformation, we must turn to the works of George Mosse.
Like Sternhell, Mosse defined fascism as a revolutionary ideology, intent
on finding a “third way” between liberalism and Marxism, enforcing the
supremacy of politics over capital, based on a bedrock of romanticized national
mystique.35 To further explore these points, Mosse probed the self-

Sternhell, “Fascism,” 56-57.
Viewed through this lens, Canovan’s “foundational myth” of popular sovereignty is just as
applicable to fascism as it is to representative democracy. By extension, the foundational myth
status of popular sovereignty could also be extended to the Marxist-Leninist concept of ‘People’s
Democracies.’ Though these autocratic systems deny individual political franchise, they still
conceptualize their power and legitimacy as emerging from the people.
35 Mosse, “Towards a General Theory of Fascism,” 89.
33
34
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conceptualization of fascist movements and ideology by viewing fascism as a
cultural phenomenon building on previous precedents in Western political
history.36 In Mosse’s estimation, the basis of fascist ideology rested in “the
rejection of parliamentary government and representative institutions on behalf of
a democracy of the masses in which the people would in theory directly govern
themselves.”37 This narrative owes a great deal to popular anti-parliamentary
traditions of the 19th century, but also betrays the populist currents that underpin
the ideology as a whole.38 It is critical to understand that even while participating
in an undeniably autocratic system, fascist true believers did not see themselves
as politically disenfranchised or un-free. Instead, the persona of the leader
becomes a proxy for the united will of the people.39 In the German context, this
dynamic was perfectly captured by the common NSDAP slogan “Ein Volk. Ein
Reich. Ein Führer,” or “One people, one state, one leader.” In the fascist
worldview, there is only one people, one state, and one leader who speaks for
all.
This begs the question, how exactly did the fascist conception of popular
sovereignty function in practice and how were people immersed within it? The
answer is that popular sovereignty was cloven away from the traditional organs
of representative democracy and incorporated into a “new secular religion” based
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on the party as a socio-political movement.40 Fascists, much like their Marxist
rivals, sought to “substitute modern mass politics for pluralistic and parliamentary
government.”41 In the fascist psyche, it matters not if the citizens could not vote,
because the organs of parliamentary pluralism are seen by fascists as invalid
representatives of the will of the people. Instead, torch light rallies, party days,
sacred party artifacts, and the paramilitarization of society served to immerse the
population in the mass politics of the party’s new secular religion. Fascism in its
many forms did radically restructure the nature of political participation, but it did
not question the foundational myth of popular sovereignty that underpins modern
Western political consciousness.
In their quest to create a collective national community, fascist ideologues
consciously sought to fuse culture, spirituality, and politics within a secular
religion dedicated to the state and party.42 The state, party, leader, and the
people themselves were cast as components of a sacred national collective.
Activism became paramount; belief itself was not enough, a proper fascist also
had to partake in the initiatives and rituals of the party and state. Even
foundational concepts such as individualism, were re-imagined as part of the
effort to forge a national collective. Individualism ceased to mean freedom to do
whatever one pleases and came to mean self-fulfillment within the context of
national collectivism. As Mosse quotes from the prospectus of Reichsschule
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Feldafing: “He who can do as he wants is not free, but he is free who does what
he should. He who feels himself without chains is not free but enslaved to his
passions.”43
In a fascist system, there can be no division between culture and politics
because all things from science to literature to ethical norms are evaluated based
on their compatibility with party orthodoxy. Hence Nazi Germany was able to
exalt the pursuit of cutting edge industrial and military technologies, whilst
categorically rejecting physics as a “Jewish science.”44 This phenomenon is why
it is so difficult to classify a ‘generic’ fascist ideology, because what may be
accepted into a specific fascist party’s secular religion may be anathema to
another. For example, in Germany where the NSDAP internalized the concepts
of völkisch nationalism since the party’s inception, Jews were persistently
targeted as alien and anything (such as physics) associated with them was held
in contempt. Meanwhile, the Austrian fascist Vaterländische Front and Italian
PNF included Jewish members.45 The specific ideological evolution of each
fascist party and the apparent contradictions therein can only be understood
within the historical context of its country of origin – much like contemporary
populist parties.
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Mosse described the fascist assimilation of trends and ideas as the
“scavenger” or “amoeba-like” nature of fascism whereby it “attempted to cater to
everything people held dear, to give new meaning to daily routine and offer
salvation without risk.”46 He correctly identified the “scavenger” quality of fascism,
but his explanation of the cause requires further expansion. Fascism did not
merely latch onto whatever proved popular and repurpose it to its own
revolutionary ends, the ideology itself was constantly encountering concepts and
ideas – both new and old – and reacting to them. Freeden’s framework of
ideological thickening provides a more robust tool for analyzing the assimilative
behavior of fascist parties.47 As fascism engaged with other thin and full
ideologies around it, it borrowed extensively from them to flesh out its own
ideological platform on its path to becoming a ‘full’ ideology. This behavior was
hardly original to fascism. Fascism simply proved highly adept at assimilating
existing ideological concepts within its historical timeframe.
The crucial distinction between fascism and National Socialism merits
closer analysis as well. The differences in policies between conventionally fascist
parties such as the Italian PNF, and National Socialism are notable. The extreme
anti-Semitism was integral to Nazism’s evolution and as a governing ideology it
utilized biologically constructed, Nordicist racial nationalism as an organizing
principle. Conversely, the PNF rejected the biological racism of the German
Mosse, “Towards a General Theory of Fascism,” 80-81.
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system and welcomed Jewish membership for the first sixteen years of its rule.48
The PNF’s monopoly of power in Italy was never as complete as the NSDAP in
Germany, the Italian monarch remained the titular head of state. The Catholic
church survived as an influential force in civil society, political opposition
persisted, and the regime’s capacity for political repression was a pale shadow of
its German neighbor. In short, the PNF’s revolutionary conquest of state power
was never as complete as that of the NSDAP. Furthermore, compared to the
NSDAP which metastasized like a cancer within the German state and colonized
virtually every aspect of governance, the PNF languished in the shadow of its
leader, Mussolini, and failed to exhibit the initiative of its German counterpart.
Finally, Italian foreign policy merely pursued a more aggressive variant of preexisting Italian imperialist and nationalist objectives, whereas Germany sought
the total revision of the global geopolitical system.49
As valid as these differences are, they are also a distraction. The
differences in policy and function of the PNF and NSDAP are a consequence of
each party’s unique thickening process and their ability (or failure) to monopolize
power effectively in their respective nations. The key to understanding the
distinction between fascism and National Socialism rests on not divergence of
ideology, but in how power is wielded. Eugen Weber beautifully summarized this
concept in Varieties of Fascism in 1964:
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Fascism is pragmatically activist, National Socialism theoretically
motivated or, at least, expressed. Both aim to conquer power, and
that center of power, which is the modern state. However, in one
case, the power will be wielded pragmatically and piecemeal,
simply for its own sake, while the party which has been its
instrument may gradually be abandoned. In the other, power will be
used to realize an anterior plan, or a series of plans inspired by the
original doctrine; and then the party may become a Church - a
Church and a dynamo.50
Weber does not suggest that fascism is bereft of substance or ideology,
merely that fascism values action above ideas.51 For example, in the case of
Italy, Mussolini’s PNF formally recorded the party’s ideological platform in The
Doctrine of Fascism in 1932; a full decade after the party entered power.
Mussolini sought power first and formalized an ideology later. Conversely, in
German National Socialism, theory presupposed action; “words and ideas count
for him [a National Socialist] as much as actions, and sometimes they replace
them.”52 In German National Socialism, all policies of the state and party had to
be legitimized within the context of party ideology – specifically within the party’s
fundamental precepts of völkisch nationalism.53 As we shall later see in Chapter
6, once the Nazis entered power the will of Hitler became inexorably merged with
50
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party ideology. Finally, as a last step before we turn to analyzing the origins of
the Nazi party’s völkisch populist origins, and the role of its twin wings, it is
imperative to understand the sweeping influence of Hitler’s personal leadership
style on the evolution of National Socialism.

Implications of Hitler’s Leadership Style
As in nature the stronger prevails, so I see to it that personalities are
able to prevail. I imagine myself to be a gardener, who looks over the
fence at his garden and watches as the plants themselves struggle
for their place in the light.54
-Adolf Hitler
Hitler’s leadership style played a central role in the thickening process of
the Nazism. He believed that if he granted his lieutenants free rein to pursue his
goals as they saw fit, then the strongest would naturally rise to the fore.55 To
achieve this, he carved off vast swathes of the party and later state, and handed
them to loyal oligarchs without specific directions regarding the structure or
boundaries of their new dominion.56 Each oligarch was left to rule as a miniature
Führer, as long as they remained beholden to Hitler and furthered his goals.
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Consequently, the NSDAP was divided among a series of competing
bureaucratic vassals who vied to leave their mark on National Socialism and
shape party policy in their own image so long as their actions did not directly
conflict with Hitler’s goals. The outcome was what Joachim Fest eloquently
dubbed “chaos goose stepping in unison.”57 Every oligarch was working towards
the same goal – National Socialist Revolution – but each was determined to
accomplish it in a different way.
Gregor Strasser used his power as the party’s organizational chief to lay
the foundations of a corporatist state.58 Ernst Röhm envisioned using the SA to
violently sweep away bourgeoisie society with a violent National Socialist
revolution.59 Robert Ley used his power over Germany’s workers to create a
totalitarian social welfare state.60 While Heinrich Himmler created a National
Socialist clone of all core functions of state governance under the umbrella of the
Schutzstaffel.61 Each of these men possessed their own vision of National
Socialism and acted to make that vision a reality – often at the expense of their
fellow oligarchs. In the process, they facilitated the thickening of National
Socialism by contributing their personal mutations of the ideology to it. As his
subordinates struggled for influence within the movement, Hitler remained aloof

57

Joachim C. Fest, Speer: The Final Verdict (New York: Harcourt, 2001), 140.
Smelser, Robert Ley, 105-106.
59 Peter Longerich, Heinrich Himmler, trans. Jeremy Noakes and Lesley Sharpe (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), 156.
60 Smelser, Robert Ley, 100, 156-157.
61 Longerich, Himmler, 123.
58

24

from their ideological quarrels.62 He would intervene only when the struggles of
his subordinates created a major crisis, or directly threatened his power. Even
after he made up his mind to intervene, he often vacillated between his options
and sent mixed signals to his subordinates before acting quickly and decisively
after a crisis could no longer be ignored.63 Consequently, Hitler’s leadership style
was characterized by long periods of letting his subordinates operate semiautonomously in his name, punctuated by decisive and ruthless periods of direct
intervention against those whom he believed had deviated from his agenda.
In this system Hitler derived his authority from his role as the ultimate
arbitrator in conflicts between his lieutenants and as the source of their political
legitimacy. Due to his messiah status within the party, all policies and actions
undertaken by his subordinates had to be legitimized as the will of the Führer.
This messianic dynamic suited Hitler’s personalist leadership style. He loathed
organizing bureaucratic structures and by his own admission, in an ‘ideal’ world,
he would have preferred to manage the party and state through propaganda
alone.64 Still, Hitler was pragmatic enough to recognize that bureaucracies were
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an inescapable necessity for translating ideas into action; so he set broad goals
determined by his personal variant of National Socialism and left his lieutenants
to create whatever systems or structures they deemed necessary to accomplish
his objectives. The personal mutations of Nazi ideology of his subordinates were
of scant concern to him, so long as they did not directly conflict with his own and
the closer to power the party came, the more draconian Hitler’s opposition to
variants of National Socialism that clashed with his own became. The result was
that Nazism, both as a party and as a governing system, was composed of
numerous different versions of Nazi ideology held in varying degrees of orbit
around Hitler. Thus, in National Socialism, Hitler played the role of the chief
idealist. It was up to others to translate his ideas into state policy and this left
significant room for the party’s wings and leading figures within them to influence
the thickening process of the ideology.65

65

Kershaw, Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), 529-530.

26

CHAPTER TWO:
RISE OF THE VÖLKISCH MOVEMENT
To analyze the rise of the Nazi party, it is necessary to bear two things in
mind. First, the NSDAP emerged as part of the populist völkisch movement,
which it gradually absorbed and used as a base for its conquest of the German
political right. Second, the Nazi party itself was not a monolithic entity, it was
beset by rampant ideological and organizational divisions inherited from the
broader völkisch movement. This chapter will analyze the rise of the völkisch
movement up to its absorption into the Nazi party in order to establish the
historical background of the events, interactions, and ideas that shaped the
Munich and Strasserite wings.
The ideological evolution of the Nazi party is particularly insightful as a
case study in the thickening of a party from a populist origin to a fascist end. Like
other fascist parties, National Socialism constructed a narrative that clove the will
of the people away from representative institutions and vested it in the hands of a
revolutionary party based on the leader principle. This narrative did not emerge
fully fledged however. It originated as a populist narrative of enforcing the ‘pure’
people’s will against the ‘corrupt’ elite and became distinctly fascist over time.
The battles within the Nazi party over how the will of the people could be
implemented to serve as a powerful reminder that ideological thickening is a
chaotic and fractious process in which the ultimate outcome is never a foregone
conclusion. This study does not seek to suggest that all populist movements are
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predestined to thicken into fascist parties, only that this is what transpired in the
case of National Socialism.

From Reaction to Revolution
The völkisch movement was a broad populist movement that formed the
bedrock of far-right political opposition to the Weimar Republic. The völkisch
movement originated as an ethno-centrist component of German romantic
nationalism during the 18th and 19th centuries. Völkisch ideology was based
around the concept of volksgemeinschaft, or a homogenous and virtuous
national community reflecting the ‘best’ aspects of German culture and undivided
by social or economic stratification.66 This idealized conception of a harmonious
national community was perceived as inseparably tied to, and in the service of, a
greater German fatherland. Such connections between the people and their
fatherland were frequently interpreted in semi-mystical terms based on shared
cultural or biological heritage. Völkisch ideologies exalted the ‘purity’ of rural
communities versus the perceived moral corruption of urban elites. In this
narrative, urban elites were constructed as either the product of ‘Roman’ or
Jewish culture, and therefore, foreign parasites.67 This conceptual dichotomy was
a direct parallel to typical populist narratives of ‘pure’ people versus a ‘corrupt’
elite but articulated in either ethnic or racial terms. Ultimately, this foundational
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element of völkisch ideology became the “blood and soil” nationalism of the
Munich wing of the Nazi party, and later the Third Reich itself.

Mainstreaming Völkisch Ideology
Völkisch ideologies first gained relevance in German politics with middle
and upper-class political pressure groups in the late 19th century. The strongest
of these was the Pan-German League, founded in 1890 which exercised
persistent influence on state policy and academic culture, during the last decades
of the Second Reich and into the Weimar Republic.68 The League played a
pivotal role in carving out a völkisch foothold in the nation’s political
establishment, making the proliferation of völkisch political movements and
narratives during the Weimar period possible.69 It would not be an exaggeration
to identify the Pan-German League as the progenitor of all völkisch movements
of the Weimar period.70 In addition to the rising influence of völkisch
organizations in late Imperial political life, Imperial policy during World War One
indirectly facilitated entry of völkisch thought into mainstream political discourse.
In 1914, Kaiser Wilhelm II formally announced the suspension of all regional,
class, as well as religious divisions within the war-time Reich, in order to create a
united national front for the prosecution of the war effort. Wilhelm was not
operating alone; his actions were part of a larger effort to affect a domestic
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political truce, and this initiative was backed with nearly universal support in the
Reichstag. Clearly, the Kaiser’s rhetoric and the institution of a broad party truce
did not truly abolish divisions within German society, nor were these objectives in
and of themselves völkisch in nature. Regardless, the results contributed to a
narrative of wartime unity that would be mobilized to great effect by völkisch
agitators in the post-war period.
Germany’s defeat in World War One proved profoundly invigorating to the
völkisch far-right. Social insecurity stemming from civil unrest, economic
collapse, and the humiliation of Versailles provided an ideal environment for
radicalization amongst the legions of demobilized soldiers, anxious elites, and
the economically marginalized generation of young men who had not served in
the war.71 Amongst these demographics, the völkisch narrative that society’s
dysfunctions could be solved through the militarization of society and a return to
the perceived comradery of the trenches found many eager recipients.72 The rise
of the stab in the back legend had left the war unfinished for many returning
veterans. Elites feared the threat of Communism, while the young lived in the
shadow of unemployment. Above all else, the specter of political violence and the
humiliation of Versailles loomed larger over the uncertain future of German
politics. Against this uncertainty völkisch demagogues promised a continuation of
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the ‘unfinished’ war for veterans, security against Communism for the elites,
action for the young, and resistance to Versailles for the nation through the total
militarization of society. This radical shift was more than mere sophistry; it was
supported and shaped by a network of radical intellectuals. An examination of the
ranks of the Nazi party’s progenitor, the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (DAP) is
particularly enlightening in this regard. The DAP included not only veterans, such
as Adolf Hitler and Ernst Röhm, but also radical intellectuals, the likes of Dietrich
Eckhardt, Alfred Rosenberg, and Gottfried Feder. Demobilized veterans and their
confederates in the bourgeois elite and dispossessed youths represented the
driving force behind the völkisch far-right, but their thoughts and actions were
shaped by the authoritarian theories developed by their own intellectuals.73
Although the völkisch movement lacked centralized leadership in its early years,
its anti-republican ambitions converged with those of established reactionary
parties, specifically the Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP). The völkisch
movement began as a junior partner to the established right-wing, but in time,
supplanted and consumed it.
The DNVP and its allies in the military, government, and paramilitary
organizations played a pivotal role in ‘mainstreaming’ the völkisch far-right. From
the perspective of Weimar reactionaries, their world had been turned upside
down, first by the loss of the war, and then by the emergence of a democratic
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order. In the words of reactionary turned centrist, Chancellor Gustav
Stresemann, reactionaries found themselves “without a solid foundation for their
thinking and emotions” in the immediate aftermath of World War One.74 They
denied the legitimacy of the Republic and lashed out against its liberal
institutions, but unable to dispose of the Republic alone they forged alliances with
the fanatical and heavily militarized paramilitary organizations of the völkisch
movement to strengthen their political position. Thus, the völkisch movement
began its ascent into the mainstream of right-wing politics, first as a paramilitary
hammer wielded by reactionary politicians in the form of Freikorps, and then as
their own distinct political parties.
The early völkisch organizations and parties, such as the
Deutschvölkischer Schutz- und Trutzbund (DVSTB),75 Deutschsozialistische
Partei (DSP),76 Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei (DVFP),77 and young NSDAP
were too small and disorganized to directly challenge the Republic at the time.
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Despite their disorganized origin, their influence grew as the reactionary DNVP
consistently failed to deliver the anti-establishment change its electorate desired.
Despite being one of the largest parties in the country, the DNVP emphatically
refused to participate in coalition governments. It was determined to have total
power or no power at all. As a result of this all-or-nothing strategy, the DNVP
condemned itself to permanent opposition status, unable to enter power or
constructively affect policy through parliamentary means.78 Due to its ineffectual
opposition status, the party’s voters gradually defected to more extreme populist
alternatives, ultimately driving much of the political right into the hands of the
NSDAP after 1928.79

The Völkisch Movement Takes Flight
Due to chronic infighting between and within its organizations, from 19191922 the völkisch movement proved itself unable to form stable political parties.
Established pre-World War One völkisch organizations, such as the PanGerman, Agrarian, and Reich Hammer Leagues, functioned as political pressure
groups and anti-Semitic rabble rousers, but they were not mass-political parties.
The movement’s capability to organize collectively was undermined by central
ideological tensions between its various proponents. Traditionalist völkisch
leadership emphasized the nationalist, agrarian, and ethnic/racial aspects of the
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ideology, particularly its anti-Semitism, but downplayed themes of social
revolution.80 Conversely, the younger generation of völkisch firebrands
radicalized during or after the war viewed themselves as part of an emerging
revolutionary right and saw their traditionalist forebearers as an extension of the
reactionary elite, lacking proper revolutionary consciousness.81 Despite their
internal struggles, both factions needed the other to survive; the traditionalists
granted the movement and air of legitimacy and provided connections to the
mainstream political right, while the revolutionaries provided fanatical foot
soldiers and popular orators such as Adolf Hitler.82
Though it remained fraught with internal conflict, the völkisch movement
continued to gain influence within the broader political right throughout the early
1920s. The nation’s largest völkisch organization, the DVSTB, boasted 180,000
members nationwide by 1922, and its swelling ranks were complimented by

80

The Pan-German League was iconic of the traditionalist variants of völkisch ideology. The
League embraced the concepts of volksgemeinschaft, anti-Semitism, and racial nationalism, but
remained wed to class division. See Björn Hofmeister, “Realms of Leadership and Residues of
Social Mobilization,” in The German Political Right in the Weimar Republic, ed. by Larry Eugene
Jones (New York: Berghahn, 2014), 136-137.
81 This central tension within the völkisch movement was perfectly captured by the early
propaganda and private diary entries of Joseph Goebbels, who regularly attacked traditionalists
as an extension of bourgeois reactionaries who lacked proper revolutionary consciousness. Both
Hitler and the Strasser brothers displayed similar animosity towards the established völkisch
traditionalists and their reactionary allies. See Joseph Goebbels, “The Radicalizing of Socialism,”
in Nazi Ideology Before 1933, 79-81. See Gregor Strasser, “From Revolt to Revolution,” 98-99.
See Hitler’s fraught relationship with the Pan-German League during the formative years of the
Nazi movement, Barry A. Jackisch, “Continuity and Change On the German Right,” in The
German Political Right in the Weimar Republic, ed. by Larry Eugene Jones (New York: Berghahn,
2014), 166.
82 Established völkisch leadership understood that the emerging revolutionary right could
challenge the socialist parties for influence over the working class, which traditional völkisch
agitators had been unable to sway. See the thoughts of Pan-German League leader Heinrich
Claß in Jackisch, “Continuity and Change,” 166. See also Hofmeister, “Realms of Leadership and
Residues of Social Mobilization,” 139.

34

active paramilitary and publishing assets. Like a microcosm of the völkisch farright in general, the DVSTB consisted of a mixture of intellectual leadership
drawn from the Pan-German League, and revolutionary paramilitaries recruited
from radicalized veterans or dispossessed youths. Even though traditionalist
intellectuals set the tenor of the movement, they were gradually marginalized
within the DVSTB’s leadership circles by activist revolutionaries who could
effectively master the art of modern mass politics.83 As a result of its rapid
expansion and penchant for revolutionary violence, the development of the
DVSTB was cut short when the party was banned in 1922. Still, the elimination of
the DVSTB did little to impede the growth of the völkisch movement itself as
many of the party’s members subsequently joined the ranks of its smaller Nazi
counterpart.84 For its part, the NSDAP commanded just under 56,000 and the
traditionalist Pan-German League reached its record size of 52,000 in
1922/1923.85
By 1922, the völkisch movement was beginning to crystallize into coherent
political organizations. In March of 1923, a formal accord was reached dividing
the völkisch movement into two broad camps. The DVFP led by Albrecht von
Gräfe was granted supremacy in the north, while the NSDAP dominated the
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south.86 Behind the entire völkisch movement, General Erich Ludendorff
emerged as a unifying godfather, not specifically tied to any one party, but
involved with all of them. The onset of the cataclysmic 1923 German inflation
crisis served to dramatically expedite the pace of völkisch agitation.87 Energized
by its swelling ranks and the precarious economic state of the nation, in 1923 the
völkisch movement began to flex its political muscle. Emboldened by the
magnitude of the crisis the upstart Nazi party attempted to seize power in alliance
with Ludendorff and Gräfe during the Beerhall Putsch in November.88 Although,
the Putsch is subsequently remembered as the dawn of Hitler’s national political
career, Ludendorff was the more prominent star of the völkisch movement at the
time.
Due to his prior military fame and political prominence, Ludendorff
embodied the type of militaristic leadership that appealed to völkisch
traditionalists and revolutionaries alike. Ludendorff was able to briefly establish
himself as the figurehead of the völkisch movement, but his national political
appeal paled in comparison to the darling of the reactionaries, General Paul von
Hindenburg. Ludendorff’s efforts to foster alliances between the various völkisch
parties also failed to win broad electoral support, while his own attempt to run for
the presidency in 1925 met with a colossal defeat that effectively terminated his
political career.89 Ludendorff’s tenure as the leader of the völkisch movement had
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been short and unsuccessful but it was not politically insignificant. Despite his
dismal electoral results, Ludendorff thrust völkisch populism into mainstream
political discourse. Ludendorff had failed, but the populism he legitimized proved
far more durable. Moreover, he demonstrated that the unification of the fractious
völkisch movement was possible, yet he lacked the political flare to solidify these
gains.
The völkisch movement had succeeded in bringing itself into the political
mainstream, but it still lacked the mass-appeal necessary to market itself to the
general electorate. Throughout the period from 1919-1924, the revolutionary right
of the völkisch movement was, however, undergoing a transformation that would
arm it with the tools it needed to become a viable mass political movement. The
German far-right was assembling its own variant of non-Marxist socialism. This
transformation did not occur in a vacuum. Mainstream German socialism,
especially the SPD, had been absorbing nationalist themes into its socialist
platform for decades, and had emerged as the most powerful party in the country
as the result. It was logical that if the far-right was ever going to assert itself as a
political force with mass appeal, it would need to engineer its own form of
socialism. This far-right variant of socialism would be based not on class
struggle, but in “socialization through the national people’s community
[volksgemeinschaft],” i.e., the creation of socialism rooted in völkisch principles.90
The turning point of this transition originated not from paramilitary personnel or
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völkisch politicians, but from the influential works of far-right literati, with the
works of Dr. Oswald Spengler being the most notable. The ideas of Dr. Spengler
were in turn, quickly adopted by the German far-right, and the völkisch
movement in particular.
Due to the international success of his most famous work, Decline of the
West, published in 1918, Spengler was armed with a powerful platform and
mainstream appeal.91 Spengler himself was a nationalist philosopher, but he saw
the creation of right-wing socialism as a necessary precondition for the survival of
the German proletariat and bourgeoisie alike.92 Like the völkisch movement that
eagerly consumed his work, Spengler himself believed that the perceived social
unity and submersion of social divisions brought about by World War One had to
be perpetuated indefinitely, even if it meant endless warfare.93 In Spengler’s
mind, ‘true’ socialism, based on a fully militarized society would form the
backbone of future empires bent on world-domination.94 Only through the joint
emergence of militarized socialism, and the rise of an all-powerful dictator, or
“Caesar,” could the forces of materialism be subdued, and global hegemony
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achieved.95 Moreover, just like his völkisch readers, Spengler assumed that the
Germans were naturally the most militarily proficient ‘race’ to ever exist, and
strongly foreshadowed that the synthesis of Caesarism and socialism would be
completed in Germany.96
To accomplish this objective, democracy, foreign culture, political freedom,
and the ultimate evil of materialism – manifest in both its capitalist and Marxist
forms, had to be excised from German society. In their place, Spengler
advocated the creation of a corporatist social structure, a society based on
martial discipline, the protection of national identity, and the implementation of
the fascist leader principle – or Caesarism, as Spengler termed it – as the
antidote to social turmoil.97 All of this would be necessary for Germany, and the
greater Western world, to survive an inescapable clash of Western civilization
against the rest of the world.
Central to Spengler’s philosophy was the concept that Prussian order and
militarism offered the most organic form of socialism and therefore, by extension,
the German people were intrinsically socialist.98 In contrast to Marxist-socialism,
which Spengler dismissed as the “capitalism of the working class,” German
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Socialism was supposed to be based on martial discipline, collectivism, and
service to the state.99 By means of the militarization of society, the submersion of
class division through a new social order based on rank and achievement, and a
corporatist social structure predicated upon a national network of occupational
councils, Spengler argued that Germany could create non-materialist “true
socialism.”100 Through this argument, Spengler lent ideological structure to the
development of a far-right socialism. This socialism would be non-Marxist, antimaterialist, and anti-democratic, based on the concept of strong central
leadership, comradery in conflict, and the militarization of society. The result of
this transformation would be the creation of nationalist socialism and the direct
forebearer of the Strasserite wing of the NSDAP.
The gradual transition to a revolutionary, far-right variant of socialism, led
to the demise of the traditionalists that dominated the völkisch movement until
Ludendorff’s fall. The field was now set for the emergence of a new kind of
völkisch movement, one that effectively mobilized both the nationalism of the
traditional right, and the right-wing socialism of the revolutionaries. Völkisch
ideology was moving towards fascism by taking its nationalist ideology from the
right, and its revolutionary impetus from the left. This synthesis was successfully
executed in the NSDAP and as a result the Nazis became Germany’s first
völkisch party with the potential to monopolize the movement.
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The Nazi Party Monopolizes the Völkisch Movement
Ludendorff’s meteoric fall created a leadership vacuum in the völkisch
movement that was readily filled by Hitler. In the aftermath of the abortive
Beerhall Putsch, he became the tub-thumping darling of the movement. The
Beerhall Putsch had been an abysmal failure, but the notoriety it generated
established Hitler as one of the leading völkisch agitators in the nation. His bid for
mastery of the movement was further enhanced by two crucial factors. During his
post-Putsch incarceration until December 1924, he understood that other
leaders’ desire to gain his blessing as a völkisch celebrity to energize their base
lent him leverage over the entire movement, and he used this leverage to play
his rivals off against each other.101 Even more importantly, unlike other völkisch
leaders such as Gräfe, Hitler avoided closely tying himself to Ludendorff’s
campaign. In truth, Hitler already perceived Ludendorff as his chief rival for
leadership of the völkisch movement and desired to see him discredited.102 Once
Ludendorff overplayed his hand and failed catastrophically, Hitler emerged as the
sole surviving völkisch figurehead left unblemished by the electoral defeat of
1925.
Hitler’s celebrity status and knack for intrigue were important components
of the NSDAP’s monopolization of the völkisch movement, but he was not the
lone architect of the party’s rise to prominence. Hitler gave the völkisch
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movement a unifying leader, but he did not give it structure. The task of
structuring and incorporating the disparate elements of the völkisch movement
inside the Nazi party rested in the hands of the party’s two competing wings. The
older Munich wing represented a new iteration of traditionalist völkisch
ideologies, based in blood and soil nationalism, mixed with strong overtones of
racial mysticism. While its rival, the upstart Strasserite Wing, emerged in 1925 as
a collection of völkisch revolutionaries pursuing a socialist interpretation of the
movement. These wings were hostile to each other, but together they formed a
National Socialist catch-all strategy that integrated the bulk of the völkisch
movement into the party and then unified it under the banner of Adolf Hitler.
Following Ludendorff’s defeat, the period from spring of 1925 to October
1929 was unfavorable for the development of large populist parties. The
economy soared. Employment rose, and a perception of stability reigned
supreme. Beneath the seemingly placid surface of Weimar politics, however, two
critical shifts were taking place within national politics in general, and the völkisch
movement in particular.
In broader national politics, despite the outward appearance of stability,
disaffection with established political parties continued to grow and manifested
itself in the form of electoral support for small protest parties.103 With the onset of
the Great Depression, many of these voters formed the base of the NSDAP’s first
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major electoral breakthrough in 1930. Meanwhile, within the völkisch movement
itself, the power vacuum created by the political defeat of 1925, combined with
Hitler’s celebrity status, and the NSDAP’s völkisch catch-all strategy consolidated
the Nazi’s grip on the remnants of the völkisch movement. The Nazis had not
dispelled the divisions within the movement. They simply succeeded in absorbing
the entire movement into a single party, rifts and all. Völkisch traditionalists and
revolutionaries still struggled ideologically, but instead of forming separate
parties, they were now separate wings of the Nazi party. During these wilderness
years, many of the foundational elements of National Socialism as a governing
ideology took form.
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE MUNICH WING
Although the Munich wing originated from völkisch traditionalists, it began
to quickly thicken into an eclectic mixture of racial nationalist, corporatist, and
semi-mystical elements due to the influence of its founding members. At the time
of the DAP’s founding in January 1919, it was merely another populist party. The
party’s foundational ideology was based on moralistic discourse and a limited
number of highly specific policy proposals, but lacked a comprehensive
programmatic platform. In this discourse, the classic populist dichotomy between
the ‘pure’ people and ‘corrupt’ elite was conceived along anti-materialist lines.
Individuals who were not perceived as creating value such as bankers and
speculators were cast as corrupt elites and the root of all society’s ills. Moreover,
existing political parties were cast as duplicitous tools of elite social control.104
Conversely, the DAP construed the ‘pure’ people as a homogeneous collective of
all working Germans, locked in a perpetual struggle against usurious elites, to be
liberated by restoring the will of the people to the halls of power. At this early
juncture, the DAP was still reformist. Although it attacked existing parties as tools
of the elite, it did not fundamentally call for the revolutionary restructuring of the
German political system. Nor did it call for a total rejection of the international
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system. On the contrary, the party advocated international laws to standardize
wages to force nations to compete in production quality, not lower the costs of
production. Likewise, they called for international regulations against reporting
“false news” as a means to “prevent the kind of incitement of peoples to
aggression, which occurred during the World War.”105 While the DAP began as a
classic populist movement, with reformist objectives and ideologically thin policy
proposals, this was about to change. Behind these populist concepts, Munich
ideologues were beginning to distinguish the party from the rest of the völkisch
movement and in the process initiated the thickening of Nazi ideology. It was the
Munich Wing that led the party’s thickening process from 1919 until the
ascendancy of the Strasserites in 1925, and this left an indelible mark on future
Nazism as a governing ideology.

Origins of Munich: The Eckart Period, 1919-1923
The Munich Wing emerged alongside the DAP and immediately began to
shape the ideology of the party in their own image. The leading figure of the
Munich wing was Dietrich Eckart, a völkisch playwright turned journalist who
afforded the party much needed connections with local power brokers.106 Joining
Eckart were two close proteges, the racial theorist Alfred Rosenberg and selfproclaimed economist Gottfried Feder. Both men proved crucial in the evolution
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of National Socialism; Rosenberg became one of the Nazi’s chief racial
ideologues, while Feder emerged as the party’s first economic theorist. Eckart’s
periodical, Auf gut Deutsch served as their collective mouthpiece and the ideas
expressed therein exerted a strong influence on the young DAP and Hitler once
he joined the party in fall of 1919.107 Due to their seniority and platform to
disseminate their message, the Munich trio were perfectly positioned to
institutionalize their own subtly different variants of what soon became National
Socialism.
During its formative years under Eckart’s leadership Munich’s ideology
developed around three pillars that proved crucial in the thickening process of
early National Socialism; anti-materialism, anti-Semitism, and a völkisch variant
of Christian morality. The first pillar, anti-materialism, represented a direct
evolution from the DAP’s moralistic discourse. Materialism was cast as an
affliction of the soul, and capitalism was perceived as the most malignant form of
materialism. Moreover, Eckart blamed capitalism as the cause of Germany’s
defeat during World War One and attacked the democratic institutions of the
Weimar Republic as the political manifestation of materialism. Thus, early Munich
ideologues argued that Germany could only be ‘saved’ if capitalism was
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dismantled and the economy both nationalized and socialized.108 Following the
lead of their self-styled economist Feder, the Munich ideologues relentlessly
called for the nationalization of banks and the abolition of interest payments,
which they identified as the origin of all society’s ills from moral decay to class
warfare.109 In this, Feder was simply expanding on the anti-materialist sentiments
of the DAP’s foundational guidelines, but in the process, began to transform the
party’s moralistic discourse into distinct policy goals.
In order to expunge capitalism from Germany, Feder proposed the
creation of a corporatist “social-state” as an alternative to parliamentary
representation.110 Like his Munich colleagues, he believed that parliamentary
representation was a pawn of capitalism that exclusively serving the interests of
a corrupt political elite; rather than the people. He thus argued that the will of the
people could only be safeguarded if politics were completely separated from
economics.111 To accomplish this, he proposed the creation of two parallel
systems of electoral representation. The first would be the House of the People
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based on an ascending hierarchy of elected councils tasked with all political
legislation.112 The second would be a parallel hierarchy of Central Councils
based on equal representation for employers and labor drawn from every
profession and tasked with the administration of a state-run economy.113 This
state-run economy would be centrally planned and administered by the Central
Councils, but it would also retain partial private ownership.114 Feder’s proposal
represented the rough-draft of the hybrid political economy of the future Third
Reich and fascinated the young Hitler, who embraced them with considerable
zeal.115 Although Feder’s concept of the social-state was fraught with logical
inconsistencies, and his works have been chronically overlooked by historians,
his theories were crucial in the development of the Nazi ideology.116 Importantly,
even beyond its personal influence on Hitler, the concept of the social-state
represented the genesis of the entire Strasserite wing of National Socialism.
The second core concept of Munich ideology was anti-Semitism. At this
early juncture, Munich’s anti-Semitism functioned as an extension of its antimaterialism.117 Eckart defined ‘Jewishness’ as the uncontrolled embrace of
earthly materialism at the expense of godly spirituality that had, according to him,
destroyed the Israelites from within and then propagated itself elsewhere in the
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world.118 He conceived ‘Jewishness’ as a materialist demon present in every
society, and that a civilization’s worth was determined by their ability to combat
their own intrinsic ‘Jewishness.’ At the same time, Eckart argued that
‘Jewishness’ could never be fully dispelled because without it individuals would
no longer be able to struggle against it and society would collapse.119 This
concept of endless struggle between materialism and society was so central to
Eckart’s worldview that he believed the world would end if ‘Jewishness’ was
eliminated.120 In this conceptualization, ‘Jewishness’ functioned as a form of
original sin that was always present in every person and nation that had to be
overcome by each generation. In short, for Eckart, ‘Jewishness’ was a
manifestation of materialism that caused all of society’s ills but could never be
completely dispelled. Feder pursued a similar argument, in which Jews
themselves were characterized as a symptom of a deeper materialist evil, but not
its cause.121
While maintaining the conflation of ‘Jewishness’ and materialism,
Rosenberg lent primacy to the racial and anti-Bolshevist dimensions of Munich’s
anti-Semitism. For Rosenberg, Jews were a distinct race, not a manifestation of
materialism, and their foreign racial status rendered them as corrupting to the
homogeneity of the nations in which they lived, thus sapping the capability of
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these nations to sustain themselves.122 To illustrate this ‘threat,’ Rosenberg wove
dire literary portraits of the destruction of his Russian homeland by the Red
Revolution and claimed that the same horrors would befall Germany if radical
action was not taken.123 This synthesis of anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism
found an eager recipient in Hitler, who rapidly internalized Rosenberg’s theories
as a core element of his own beliefs.124 Beyond his specific fixation on Russia,
Rosenberg latched onto all manner of conspiracy theories that unified Munich’s
strident anti-materialism and seething anti-Semitism. For him, capitalism and
internationalism in any form were sinister tools of a global “Jewish financial
dictatorship” that was determined to debase the racial purity of nation-states.125
This institutionalized anti-Semitic paranoia played a central role in the formative
stages of Nazi ideology. These conspiracy theories allowed the Nazis to
construct a pervasive siege mentality in which every foreign nation, international
organization, democratic institution, capitalist business, and competing ideology
were seen as potentially compromised by ‘Jewish’ interests and therefore, a
threat to German national security.126 Within this mindset Rosenberg and his
colleagues argued that Germany could only be safe if it was racially pure. This

Alfred Rosenberg, “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and Jewish World Policy,” in Nazi
Ideology Before 1933, 47, 57-58.
123 Alfred Rosenberg, “The Russian Jewish Revolution,” in Nazi Ideology Before 1933, 15-16.
124 Volker Ulrich, Hitler: Ascent 1889-1939, trans. Jefferson Chase (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
2016), 107-108. See also Cecil, The Myth of the Master Race, 45.
125 Rosenberg, “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion,” 47-48.
126 Rosenberg, “The Russian Jewish Revolution,” 13.
122

50

was the penultimate pillar of Munich ideology, and it was already established
before Hitler rose to the fore of the Nazi movement.
The third and final core concept was comprised of mysticism conjoined
with a völkisch version of religious nationalism. This spiritual dynamic enabled
National Socialism to function as a political religion wherein service to the Nazi
party was perceived as a holy mission in the service of the German nation. In
addition to its intimate relationship with the wing’s earliest concepts of antiSemitism, this spiritual element of Munich ideology lent itself to the belief that
Germany would be saved from its materialist degeneration by a messiah who
embodied the spiritual heart of the nation.127 The Munich ideologues found their
long-awaited messiah in the figure of Adolf Hitler. Aided by his support and
personalist leadership style, this messianic veneration paired with the concept of
the leader principle borrowed from other fascist movements laid the foundation of
the infamous Führer cult after 1922.128

The Nazi Platform Emerges: 1920
Hitler rose to prominence in the party in 1920 and his subsequent seizure
of power within further empowered the Munich Wing.129 First and foremost,
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Hitler’s demagogic talents lent the Nazis regional prominence and provided
Munich’s ideas greater public exposure. Secondly, he presented the kind of
messianic leader whom the Munich ideologues were seeking. Moreover, his
infatuation with racial nationalism and anti-Semitism reinforced the ideological
transition already underway in the wing, and he integrated their ideas with his
own. Finally, the concept of living space that shaped every aspect of Hitler’s
world-view was swiftly incorporated into Munich ideology and contributed a
crucial new plank to the party’s thickening ideological framework in the
process.130 In summary, the Munich Wing enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with
Hitler. In conjunction with Hitler, Munich created much of the Nazi party’s racial
ideological dogma, but without him, they were bereft of a public platform to
propagate it beyond the völkisch movement.
Following the reorganization of the DAP as the NSDAP, in February of
1920, Nazi ideology thickened into the party's first formal platform - the TwentyFive Point Program. The creation of this program was a decisive step in Nazism’s
transition away from thin-centered populism towards the creation of a fuller
ideology. The Twenty-Five points are a clear example of how personal
ideological mutations become institutionalized due to the influence of specific
actors. Functionally, the Twenty-Five Points constituted a compilation of personal
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variations of Nazi ideology espoused by the Munich ideologues combined with
new elements introduced by Hitler. Racial nationalist themes were omnipresent
throughout. Citizenship was conceived in strictly racial terms, all individuals not of
German ‘blood’ were regarded as foreigners and Jews were specifically barred
from citizenship.131 The Points advocated a ban on all foreign immigration and, in
the event of national hardship, the expulsion of non-Germans as well. Above all
else, the Points maintained that the purpose of the state was to protect the
livelihood of all ethnic Germans and to create legal equality between them,
regardless of class origin, and at the expense of non-Germans.132 These racial
nationalist motifs emerged from Munich’s collective obsession with purity and
were subsequently developed into the concept of the völkisch state that
undergirded the entire governing system of the Third Reich.
In addition to the Point’s racial nationalism, the document strongly
reflected Munich’s embryonic corporatist tendencies and somewhat nebulous
socialism. Feder’s influence was particularly strongly felt here, as many of the
economic concepts utilized in the Points were drawn directly from his theories.
Although the economic proposals of the Points included several measures to
reduce the fiscal burden on the middle class, their primary objective was to
strengthen the economic power of the central government at the expense of
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private industry.133 The Points called for the nationalization of all corporate trusts,
profit sharing with workers in large corporations, and the introduction of law
allowing the government to nationalize land without compensation for private
interests. Moreover, in a clear shot at the capitalist class, the Points demanded
the abolition of all income unearned by labor, including interest payments and
land speculation.134 While these elements were tailored to degrade the influence
of Germany’s capitalist class, they were also designed as tools to control the
working classes. Point 10 specifically mandated that it was the primary duty of all
citizens to work physically and mentally for the greater good the state.135 This
was an early display of the inherent totalitarianism of Nazi ideology; the Nazis
would only tolerate private endeavors as long as they were aligned with state
objectives. Finally, in order to execute the party’s proposals, the document
advocated the creation of a strong central parliament and the creation of
corporatist chambers at the regional level, along the lines of Feder’s Central
Councils, to fully enforce the state’s will across the country.136
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True to Munich form, the entire program was clothed in anti-materialist
and anti-Semitic terms. The existing legal system of the Weimar Republic was
dismissed as a tool of “a materialistic world order,” and in its place, the party
demanded the creation of German Common Law based on reciprocity, ethnic
solidarity, and harsh punishments.137 Likewise, echoing the mystical themes of
Eckart and Rosenberg, the program exalted non-denominational “positive
Christianity” as an antidote to the “Jewish materialistic spirit within and around
us.”138 In time, the Nazi’s anti-materialist sentiments would lose most of their
overtly Christian overtones in favor of a mystification of the party and Führer, but
the effect remained the same. Like other fascist ideologies, National Socialism
functioned as a civic religion, in the case of the Nazis, the spiritual concepts that
underpinned these mystical elements originated in the Munich Wing.
Finally, in the realm of foreign policy, the Points repeated the typical
völkisch calls for a Pan-German state and repudiation of the treaties of Versailles
and Saint-Germain. Additionally, in a clear demonstration of Hitler’s influence, the
document also included a demand for living space to support the expansion of
the German population. Up to this point, the Munich Wing had remained fixated
on domestic affairs, but Hitler was lending the ideology a distinctly expansionist
agenda.
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The Twenty-Five Points represented Munich’s most enduring legacy in the
Nazi movement. The Points soldiered as the formal program of the Nazi party
throughout its entire existence, despite widespread popular confusion regarding
the points and efforts within the party to clarify or reform them.139 Nazism was
thickening, but still far from a full ideology, and the Points left many details
unanswered. These voids created ample opportunities for ideologues and
functionaries to struggle amongst themselves to influence the course of party
ideology.

Rise and Fall of the Esser Clique: 1921-1924
With the party’s foundational ideology established, the Munich Wing
turned its attention to strengthening the Nazi’s foothold in the völkisch movement.
The Twenty-Five Points established the broad outline of Nazi ideology, but the
Munich Wing now set about to continue codifying Nazi ideology in their own
terms through propaganda.140 Eckart facilitated the Nazi’s acquisition of their first
official party newspaper, the Völkischer Beobachter in December 1920, and a
year later he became its chief editor.141 This heightened focus on propaganda
heralded a turning-point in the evolution of the Munich Wing. The influence of its
original ideologues declined in favor of more capable propagandists, rising from
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the ranks of the party. Munich continued to operate as a wing of the party, but its
leadership and priorities shifted.
As the Munich Wing devoted their efforts to propaganda, the anti-Semitic
and racial nationalist elements of their ideology continued to thicken, but the
economic themes did not. Despite his senior role in the Völkischer Beobachter,
Eckart was pushed away from the center of the party and his personal
relationship with Hitler cooled.142 Likewise, Feder became isolated as his
corporatist concepts lost their prime position within Nazi ideology. Among the
original ideologues, Rosenberg was unique in that the transition to an entirely
racial nationalist platform solidified his position as the party’s leading
‘philosopher’ and amplified his influence. As a sign of his growing prominence, in
1923 Rosenberg displaced his former mentor Eckart at the helm of the party’s
prized Völkischer Beobachter.143
Although Rosenberg remained the ideological spirit of the Munich Wing,
he lacked the administrative acumen to translate his influence into power within
the party or lend Munich’s concepts popular appeal. The task of popularizing
Munich’s ideas was left to a new generation of propagandists. The new leading
men in Munich were the anti-Semitic journalist Hermann Esser, party publisher
Max Amann, and the anti-Semitic zealot Julius Streicher. Of this trio, Esser was
the most powerful. In fall of 1920, he established a reputation as an adept rabble-
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rouser and the party’s then most talented speaker behind Hitler.144 In 1923, his
burgeoning notoriety and personal favor with Hitler earned him a formal position
as the party’s first propaganda chief. Max Amann, a wartime colleague of Hitler,
carved out a smaller sphere of influence at the head of the party’s publishing
house in 1922. The same year, the notorious anti-Semitic agitator Julius
Streicher rose to prominence by leading his followers into the Nazi movement
and precipitating the fall of the rival DSP in the process.145 In 1923 Streicher
consolidated his influence by founding the salacious anti-Semitic tabloid Der
Stürmer, as his own private venture aligned with party interests. The new clique
led by Esser was obsessed with racial nationalism and pursued racial themes to
the exclusion of all others. The rise of the Esser clique was a classic example of
how individuals drive ideological development. The pivot to propaganda strongly
favored adept rabble-rousers, and the fanatical racial nationalists of the Esser
clique proved highly capable of marginalizing their predecessors and thickening
the racial nationalist themes already present in the ideology in the process.
This fixation on race, combined with relentless harassment of their
colleagues solidified Munich’s dominance in the Nazi’s Bavarian homeland, but
simultaneously sowed the seeds of the wing’s downfall. The Nazis had secured a
fanatical racial nationalist base in the south, but they were poorly equipped to
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expand their appeal amongst the socialist and corporatist elements of the
völkisch movement that permeated Germany’s heavily industrialized north and
west. Regardless, in 1923, the DVFP in northern Germany was still too powerful
to challenge; the Nazis would remain confined to the south for the foreseeable
future. As long as Hitler remained unchallenged as the leader of the party, the
Munich wing remained the uncontested masters of Nazi ideological development
as their racial politics were synchronized with his own. Yet, despite their
symbiotic relationship with Hitler, the dominion of Munich would not last for long.
The failure of the Beerhall Putsch in November 1923 cast the Nazi
movement and the Munich Wing, in particular, into complete disarray. Although
the subsequent media coverage of the trial made Hitler and the Nazis celebrities
in völkisch circles, the more immediate consequences of the Putsch nearly
destroyed the NSDAP.146 The Nazis already lacked any central organizational
structure beyond the Munich Wing, and Munich was decapitated. The NSDAP
was banned, its operations forced underground, and its properties, including the
crucial Völkischer Beobachter, were seized by state authorities.147 Esser
temporarily fled to Austria, Amann was imprisoned, and Eckart died of a heart
attack in December. Of the senior leadership of Munich, only Streicher and
Rosenberg remained at large. In an effort to retain continuity, Hitler appointed
Rosenberg as the party’s leader in his absence.148 With Hitler temporarily
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removed from the political stage first by his trial, and then by his disinclination to
become embroiled in party politics until his release in December 1924, the period
between November 1923 and February 1925 became a Nazi interregnum that
temporarily disrupted ideological thickening due to internal instability. 149 As a
result of this period of transition, Munich lost control of Nazi ideology in favor of
challengers from the north, and in the process, National Socialism entered a
period of socialist and corporatist ideological thickening.
In the aftermath of Hitler’s apparent demise, the initiative in the völkisch
movement shifted away from the Nazis in favor of the then stronger DVFP.
Although popular support for the Nazis was still growing, without active political
leadership this growth could not be sustained. Drastic steps were necessary if
the Nazis were going to remain politically relevant. Working in conjunction with
the rising party organizer Gregor Strasser, Rosenberg brought the remnants of
the Nazi party into a makeshift electoral alliance with other völkisch parties called
the Völkischer Block for the May 1924 elections.150 The proposed pivot to
electoral politics proved highly divisive because it contravened Hitler’s pre-Putsch
assertions that the Nazis would never enter electoral politics.151 For his part,
Hitler remained ambivalent towards participating in the Block. He was keenly
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aware that it threatened his personal political power, but his incarceration left him
unable to oppose it effectively.152 Simultaneously, he had no desire to alienate
his loyalist fanatics by taking responsibility for the decision to enter electoral
politics. Instead, he played both sides by formally leaving the final electoral
decision to Rosenberg while secretly working behind the scenes through Esser
and Streicher to oppose the party’s participation in the Block.153 The party’s first
experiment with a policy of legality would go ahead without Hitler. Unsurprisingly,
given the fractious and unstable nature of the party at the time, Rosenberg’s
decision to collaborate with the Block ignited a crisis.
In June, following significant gains for the Block in Bavarian regional
elections and modest gains on the national scale, Ludendorff and Gräfe
unilaterally attempted to merge the Nazis into the DVFP.154 Hitler responded by
immediately disavowing the merger and then banned any member of the party
from issuing statements in his name, thereby terminating Rosenberg’s status as
interim party leader. Upon his dismissal, Rosenberg requested Gregor Strasser
be appointed the new interim leader, but Hitler preferred to leave the position
vacant.155 In the absence of clear leadership, Streicher and Esser, seized the
opportunity to resurrect the Esser clique. Rosenberg was removed from Munich’s
leadership circle and reverted to his role as the party’s chief philosopher. Despite
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his defeat by the Esser clique, he soon resurfaced with his most crucial
contribution to Nazi ideological development, the concept of the völkisch state.

The Concept of the Völkisch State Takes Form: 1924
Although stripped of formal power, Rosenberg retained significant
influence as the party’s chief philosopher. While Hitler was writing Mein Kampf in
Landsberg Prison, Rosenberg was refining Munich’s ideology into a single, allencompassing concept, the völkisch state. The völkisch state was the most
crucial element of Nazi ideology produced by the Munich wing because it served
as the organizing principle of Nazism as a governing ideology. Every aspect of
policy and state structure in the future Third Reich would be based on the
völkisch state. By Rosenberg’s definition, the völkisch state consisted of three
pillars: the promotion of racial purity as state ideology, the implementation of
‘social justice,’ and National Socialism as an epoch-making revolution in world
history.
According to Rosenberg, the promotion and protection of racial purity was
the first and foremost purpose of the völkisch state.156 Consistent with Munich’s
increasing emphasis on racial themes, the völkisch state sought the total
synchronization of race and state. Citizenship would be determined entirely by
racial ancestry. Thus, enabling the state to claim sovereignty over ethnic
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Germans all over the continent, whilst excluding anyone deemed Jewish or
foreign from civil society. Regional and sectarian identities would be dissolved in
favor of a homogeneous national racial identity as well. For example, there would
be no room for Bavarians or Protestants; only Germans from Bavaria and
Germans who practiced Protestantism.157 Likewise, all ideologies not based on
race were also targeted for elimination. Marxism, capitalism, monarchism,
nationalist conservatism, and even Italian Fascism were all slated for elimination
on the grounds that they were either materialist or internationalist and thus
antithetical to a völkisch state.158 To perpetuate the völkisch state, Rosenberg
advocated the creation of a new national spirituality based on the veneration of
German racial heritage. By creating a race-based spirituality, he believed
materialism in all its forms could be prevented from taking root in the
population.159 To accomplish this, the country’s legal and educational systems
would be redesigned as tools to inculcate the racial and anti-materialist precepts
of national spirituality in each succeeding generation.160 This new national
spirituality would in turn root all political and cultural aspects of society in the
racial nationalism of the völkisch state. Following the lead of Eckart before him,
Rosenberg initially attempted to base his new spirituality in a “positive
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Christianity,” but he gradually abandoned it in favor of ‘German’ Nordic neopagan themes that he deemed more inherently German and less susceptible to
external influence.
The second pillar was the implementation of “social justice.” In this case,
social justice included a wide range of social and institutional reforms intended to
create totalitarian social harmony. All internal social divisions – save those of
race – were regarded as obsolete materialist constructs due to be dismantled at
the earliest opportunity.161 To secure this concept of social justice, the völkisch
state would necessarily have to create its own form of “state socialism.” Although
like his fellow Munich ideologues, Rosenberg failed to develop the specifics of his
socialist principles, the broad themes were clear. This state socialism would be
based on a reciprocal relationship between the state providing material benefits
to its citizens, and citizens in turn owing the state a debt of duty to defend its
racial hierarchy.162 Following this logic, Rosenberg argued that as long as the
state guaranteed the material and physical security of individuals, then
individuals would buy into the völkisch concept of state.163 Events subsequently
proved him correct. Once given tangible form through the corporatist concepts
and organization of the Strasserites, this reciprocal relationship proved crucial to
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the Nazis’ efforts to secure social control after attaining power in 1933 through
the Deutsche Arbeitsfront.
The third and final pillar of the völkisch state was the creation of a new
world order in opposition to the “internationalism” of capitalism and Marxism.164 It
was not enough for the National Socialism to merely create a völkisch state in
Germany. On the contrary, Rosenberg argued that the völkisch state was a
revolutionary concept that had to be exported to every European country, by
force if necessary. In Rosenberg’s mind, it was the destiny of the Nazis to usher
in a new era of human history by eliminating capitalist and Marxist systems all
over Europe and erecting völkisch states in their stead.165 Thus, the Nazi
revolution would not be complete until it created a new world order rooted in
Germany as its metropole of revolution. The concept of the völkisch state as an
epoch-making idea was subsequently embraced to devastating effect by Heinrich
Himmler as the paramount objective of the Schutzstaffel.166
The völkisch state represented the consolidation of Munich’s obsession
with racial purity into a race-based conceptualization of the state, but it was not
the end of Nazi ideological thickening. The socialist elements of National
Socialism remained thin. Expanding the ideology’s socialist principles was
necessary to both fully conquer the völkisch movement, and to extend the party’s
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influence into the general population. However, this task eluded the Munich wing.
The wing’s leading Esser Clique was primarily concerned with propagating racial
nationalist propaganda, and Rosenberg lacked the organizational acumen to
extend National Socialism’s grip over the broader völkisch movement. As
prominent as Munich’s racial ideas subsequently became during the Third Reich,
in 1924 they were preaching to the already converted. If National Socialism was
going to extend its grip beyond the racial elements of the völkisch movement,
then it needed to follow Spengler’s lead and articulate its own vision of right-wing
socialism.

Rebellion in the North: 1924-1925
At first glance, it appeared that the resurgence of the Esser Clique marked
the restoration of Munich’s pre-Putsch power. In truth, however, Munich was
losing its grip on power as the Nazi movement expanded across the country.
Throughout 1924, the growing national notoriety of the Nazis stemming from
Hitler’s trial, and the upsurge of popular support for the völkisch movement
bolstered the party’s ranks. Moreover, Rosenberg’s decision to participate in
elections combined with Hitler’s personal publicity vastly expanded the Nazis’
largesse within the larger völkisch movement. In the latter half of 1924 and well
into 1925, the DVFP’s young and radical members abandoned it in favor of the
more revolutionary Nazis.167 As the DVFP declined the Munich Wing attempted
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to centralize its control over the Nazi’s new northern chapters, but their efforts
were futile. The handful of Munich advocates in the north who formed a loyalist
‘Directorate’ were consistently outnumbered and outmaneuvered by their local
rivals.168 Moreover, the meddling of Munich was met with open hostility in the
north, and the brusque leadership styles of the Esser clique did little to
ameliorate the regional divide.169
Instead, the DVFP defectors found a different source of leadership in the
form of the emerging Nazi organizer, Gregor Strasser.170 Unlike the Munich
leadership, Strasser possessed a vast network of contacts in the north and west,
parliamentary experience, and exceptional administrative acumen.171 The Nazis’
new northern chapters were loyal to Hitler as their figure-head and Strasser as
their operational chief, but they did not answer to Munich. In February of 1925,
Hitler granted Strasser full organizational control over the NSDAP in northern and
western Germany and in the process confirmed Munich’s loss of control in the
north. Strasser wasted no time in appointing his own colleagues to senior posts
and consolidating his position at the expense of the Munich leadership –
particularly Esser and Streicher, who were almost universally despised in the
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north.172 Munich was defeated, and although it remained politically relevant in
Bavaria, it never recovered its leading position in the movement. The ideological
impetus behind National Socialism passed to Strasser and his colleagues. The
period of ideological interregnum was over, and the board was set for a period of
ideological experimentation and the expansion of National Socialism’s corporatist
and socialist elements.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
THE STRASSERITE WING
We are socialists, enemies, mortal enemies of the present capitalist
economic system with its exploitation of the economically weak, its
injustice in wages, with its immoral evaluation of individuals
according to wealth and money instead of responsibility and
achievement, and we are determined under all circumstances to
abolish this system!173
-Gregor Strasser

Hitler’s decision to empower Strasser as the leader of the Nazi party in
northern Germany marked a crucial turning point in the evolution of National
Socialism. The empowerment of Strasser confirmed the north-south split and
guaranteed the creation of a new wing in the north under the semi-autonomous
leadership of Strasser. Even more importantly, the creation of this new wing from
the disparate elements of the northern völkisch movements and the rise of
Strasser touched off a period of experimentation in the party’s ideological
thickening. Unlike Hitler, Strasser assumed that that the Nazis would have to
cooperate with other political groups to achieve their objectives and as a result
his wing was not impermeable to ideas originating beyond völkisch circles.174 The
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development of the Strasserite wing can be divided into two broad periods. The
first was the formative Elberfeld Period (1924-1926), during which Strasser led a
broad network of socialist ideologues dedicated to expanding on Feder’s ideas to
create a socialist and corporatist party platform. The second was the Strasserite
Period (1926-1932), wherein the wing became synonymous with Gregor
Strasser’s political empire and lent structural form to early Nazi governance.
Across his career, Strasser was more successful than any other ideologue in
introducing new ideas and concepts to the party’s ‘mainstream.’175 Consequently,
with the exception of Hitler himself, Strasser was the best example in the Nazi
party of how an individual’s seniority and influence within a movement can
decisively shape the direction of ideological development.
In Gregor’s view, Hitler was the embodiment of the movement, but he
served as its chief political organizer and strategist.176 Strasser was one of an
extremely small cadre of senior Nazi leaders who did not subscribe to the führer
cult.177 He regularly battled with the Munich wing over the direction of party
ideology and erroneously believed that Hitler could be won over to his vision of
National Socialism.178 To further these objectives, Strasser surrounded himself
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with a network of ideologues adhering to socialist interpretations of the
movement, including his brother Otto Strasser, labor agitator Reinhold Muchow,
and most infamously Joseph Goebbels.179 While Hitler basked in the limelight as
the party’s charismatic leader, Strasser extended the NSDAP’s reach beyond
Bavaria, built a national network of contacts within and beyond the party, and
served as its most outspoken advocate in the Reichstag. Before his downfall in
December of 1932, Gregor Strasser was the second man in the NSDAP. His
eponymous wing a force to be reckoned with, both for other party ideologues and
potentially for Hitler himself. Although Gregor Strasser’s influence upon the party
was vast, his autonomy would ultimately lead to his downfall. Hitler would brook
no equal; Strasser’s efforts to structure the movement, as well as its ideology,
and facilitate the Nazis’ ascension to power through existing power-networks
threatened Hitler’s dominance.
The central difference between the Strasserites and their Munich rivals
rested in their differing emphases on anti-materialism and racial nationalism. Like
Eckart and Feder in the early days of Munich, the Strasserites widely employed
anti-Semitic themes, but they did so as a supporting element of their antimaterialism, not as the central focus of their ideology. To quote Goebbels, antiSemitism was “the beginning of our knowledge. But it still is not everything” and
he characterized the racial musings of Munich as a “race Nordification fart.”180
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‘Jewishness’ was depicted as inseparable from capitalism and, therefore,
antithetical to the economic and social objectives of Strasserite National
Socialism. However, they regarded the racial ideas that permeated the Munich
wing, particularly the works of Rosenberg, with suspicion and sometimes open
hostility. Unlike their Munich rivals, who by 1924 viewed racial purity as the
central tenet of their ideology, Gregor Strasser observed that “blood tests,
Nordicization, and so forth…appear to my practical mind somewhat dubious.”181
Goebbels reinforced these sentiments by publicly attacking the “primitive” antiSemitism of the broader völkisch movement as a fig-leaf intended to conceal the
complicity of Germany’s capitalist and bourgeoisie classes in the exploitation of
labor.182 Still, the Strasserite Wing remained rabidly anti-Semitic, routinely
blamed Jews for the growth of both capitalism as well as Marxism, and called for
their legal exclusion from German society.183 The crucial difference was in the
ideological motivation behind the exclusion; while Munich based its anti-Semitism
on racial nationalism, the Strasserites based it on anti-materialism.

The Elberfeld Period and the
“Mecca of German Socialism:” 1925-1926
The roots of the Strasserite wing are inexorably intertwined with the career
of its leader, Gregor Strasser. Strasser participated in the Beerhall Putsch, but
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survived the debacle with nothing more than a few weeks in jail and a small fine.
Consequently, while Hitler’s courtroom theatrics catapulted him to stardom and
provided a national stage for NSDAP propaganda, and Munich struggled to fill
the power vacuum, Strasser remained at large to capitalize on the Nazis’ sudden
national recognition and the commensurate decline of the DVFP. While
remaining affiliated with the banned NSDAP, Strasser became a nationally
recognized figure in the broader völkisch movement as well. During 1924, he
became the leader of the Völkischer Block in the Bavarian Landtag and a
prominent Reichstag representative of the national völkisch umbrella
organization, the Nationalsozialistische Freiheitsbewegung.184 Unlike his rivals in
Munich, who either stubbornly refused to participate in electoral politics or
restricted themselves to exclusively working inside the Nazi party, Strasser was
connected to all of the major völkisch political factions. While Hitler remained
confined to Landsberg Prison until December of 1924, and then banned from
public speaking in most states until 1927-1928, Gregor Strasser emerged as the
de-facto organizational chief of the Nazi movement outside of Bavaria.185 Once
Hitler formally empowered Strasser to lead the fledgling NSDAP in the fertile
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political landscape of northern Germany in February of 1925, Strasser’s rise to
prominence as the second man in the Nazi party was virtually assured.186
Strasser was unleashed. Armed with considerable organizational acumen
and a network of connections amongst national völkisch organizations and the
Reichstag, he engineered the rapid expansion of the party in northern Germany
from 71 chapters in 1923 to a commanding 272 by the end of 1925.187 While
Hitler secluded himself in Berchtesgaden writing the second volume of Mein
Kampf, Strasser represented the party on the national political stage with
frequent speeches in the Reichstag and at gatherings across the country.188
Thus, following the party’s re-establishment in the aftermath of the Beerhall
Putsch, it was Strasser, not Hitler, who was responsible for organizing the day-today affairs of the party’s expansion. National expansion represented numerous
practical and ideological challenges for the nascent Nazi party. First and
foremost, until Hitler’s trial showered the party with attention in the media, the
NSDAP had been virtually unknown outside of Bavaria, and its rural völkisch
agenda was ill-suited for the urban politics of north and western Germany.
Second, the party had proliferated across the nation as a series of largely
disconnected local chapters, and beyond Bavaria the party establishment
exercised little economic or ideological control. If the NSDAP was to distinguish
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itself from the plethora of fleeting Weimar populist parties, it required organization
and central leadership. Recognizing the necessity of centralized control, Strasser
focused on hammering the disparate regional chapters into a cohesive national
movement, and in the process sought to institutionalize his socialist conception of
the ideology.
Strasser’s efforts to rationalize the movement advanced on two broad
fronts, the first was ideological and the second organizational. In pursuit of these
goals, he collected a network of northern and western Nazi activists and
ideologues based in Elberfeld whose primary objective was to supplant the
Munich wing as the heart of National Socialism.189 Throughout 1925, ideological
objectives took precedent. Building on the example of previous socialist
movements, Strasser deduced that ideological structure and consistency was
necessary to create a national movement. To this end, he furnished Elberfeld
with a series of newspapers, and periodicals intended to target all levels of
society, from the working proletariat to the intellectual classes. Strasser intended
to publish “a political and academic newspaper, like the socialist
monthlies…which clarifies and explains problems of National Socialist foreign,
domestic and economic policy independent of any official influences.”190 The
goals of this endeavor were two-fold. The first was propagandistic and intended
to broaden the party’s public appeal. The second was intended to strengthen
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Elberfeld’s influence against Munich by establishing official party press controlled
exclusively by Elberfeld devotees. The leader of Elberfeld’s budding publishing
empire would be Gregor’s brother and veteran socialist agitator, Dr. Otto
Strasser.191 Otto’s mission was clear; to bring intellectual cohesion to the
NSDAP’s message, root it in a socialist variant of the ideology, and relentlessly
attack the party establishment in Munich.192 In this endeavor, Otto would be
assisted by one of the movement’s most vociferous socialist firebrands, the
young Dr. Joseph Goebbels, who rapidly rose to prominence for his ascorbic wit,
as well as his anti-bourgeoisie and pro-Russian sentiments. Despite a failed
effort to recruit the intellectual godfather of German right-wing socialism, Oswald
Spengler, as the head of a new party newspaper, Strasser’s publishing plans
greatly strengthened Elberfeld’s position within the party.193
However, the Elberfeld offensive had not yet reached its crescendo.
Simultaneous to their efforts to create an Elberfeld controlled party press,
Strasser and his allies began overtly to challenge the political dominance of
Munich. On September 10, “Working Community North West” was constituted
from north and western Gauleiter194 with the objective of replacing the official
Twenty-Five Point program. The new platform was produced by gathering the
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policy proposals of Elberfeld’s Gauleiter and leading members, debating their
merit amongst their peers and then incorporating these suggestions in the
draft.195 Unsurprisingly, the process was beset by personal rivalries, and the
completed draft was at times contradictory. Despite these challenges, it did serve
to clarify the central socialist and corporatist overtones of Elberfeld ideology and
revealed a significant degree of collective decision making that would prove
antithetical to Hitler.
Despite friction between its members, the Working Community
represented a significant step towards solidifying the party’s platform around
Elberfeld’s ideology at the expense of Munich. The Working Community formally
announced their intention to work in Hitler’s name and duly notified him of their
efforts but did not specifically solicit his blessing for their actions.196 Although the
Working Community was openly hostile towards Munich, Hitler characteristically
stood aloof from the ideological infighting of his subordinates. He offered his
(unsolicited) approval of the Working Community as a routine reaffirmation of
authority over party affairs but took no overt action against the Community.197
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Hitler did not yet appreciate the implicit threat the Community’s very existence
posed to his leadership.

Elberfeld’s Corporatist Reich: 1925
In November of 1925, Strasser disseminated a draft of the new party
platform as prepared by him and other Elberfeld representatives. The document
was an overt example of an attempt to combine the personal mutations of
Nazism of the Elberfeld ideologues and institutionalize them in a new party
platform. The draft platform expanded upon many of the original Twenty-Five
Points, but also sought to define a corporatist state structure and expand the
scope of the party’s foreign and domestic policies. Although far from a polished
and concise document, the new platform represented a major step forward in the
ideological thickening of the wing. In foreign affairs, the document endorsed
revanchist causes, including the reclamation of Imperial Germany’s 1914 borders
as well as its central African colonial empire. Even more curiously, it also
advocated the creation of a United States of Europe complete with a uniform
system of measure and common currency. This United States of Europe would
be created and dominated by a Greater German Reich composed of all ethnic
German populations serving as the military, economic, and ideological hegemon
of the new continental order. Not content with regional dominance, the new
United States of Europe would in turn serve as the foundation for an alliance with
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the Soviet Union in opposition to the capitalist powers.198 The last of these
proposals strongly reflected the influence of Otto Strasser and Goebbels, both of
whom saw a cataclysmic struggle with capitalism as the chief aim of the National
Socialist movement.199 As is evident in this eclectic collection of foreign
proposals, Elberfeld’s foreign policy was composed of a mixture of nationalist
revanchism, pan-Europeanism, and socialist anti-capitalism.
The platform also proposed a concrete governing system for National
Socialism for the first time in the form of a corporatist semi-presidential republic.
The Reichspresident would be jointly elected by the National Council and Reich
Chamber of Corporations and would serve a seven-year term as the head of
state. The Reichspresident would possess the power to designate state
presidents and appoint ministers, in addition to shaping the state’s foreign policy
in conjunction with the Reichsministry. The first Reichspresident – presumably
Hitler – would also serve as dictator, although the document did not elaborate
what specific special powers would be invested in the dictator.200 Day to day
affairs of national government would be handled by the Reichsministry, led by the
Reichschancellor as head of government. The legislative bodies of government
would be a National Council and a Chamber of Corporations serving roughly
analogous roles to upper and lower houses of parliament. The National Council
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would consist of twelve to fourteen state presidents, joined by the five chairmen
of occupational chambers of the Reich Chamber of Corporations, and the
Reichspresident serving as the Council’s chairman. Finally, the Reich Chamber
of Corporations would consist of 100 representatives evenly drawn from the five
occupational chambers, plus another ten named directly by the
Reichspresident.201 In essence, the proposed state reflected an authoritarian
reimagining of the government of the Weimar Republic along distinctly corporatist
lines.
Much like its foreign policy, the platform’s economic and social proposals
reflected a similar blend of nationalist and socialist thought. Private property
rights would be preserved, but control over the means of production would be
transferred to the state. The proposed result retained characteristics of capitalist
private ownership and Leninist command economy, complete with partial
collectivization. Free trade was perceived as a threat to the organic nature of
society and was due to be eliminated where feasible.202 All economic activity
would be overseen by regional, state, and Reich level Chambers of Corporations.
These chambers were envisioned as administrative and regulatory bodies
designed to observe and control economic life. Additionally, they would possess
powers to investigate economic complaints and advise officials in economic
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matters.203 All businesses employing more than twenty employees were due to
be converted to joint-stock corporations. The state would control a majority share
in all essential industries, and a strong minority share in all non-essential
industries.204 Likewise, employees in each joint-stock corporation would be
grouped into a worker’s union with a ten-percent share of the company to
guarantee labor a seat at the table. Large agricultural estates were due to be
broken up entirely, but small-hold hereditary farmers were afforded legal and
financial protections from the state.205 Although this proposed economic system
deliberately favored small-businesses, it was far from a petite bourgeoisie
paradise. These reforms were intended to enhance the power of the state as the
central actor in a corporatist society. To reinforce state control, the direct sale of
produce would be banned and small businesses as well as farmers were due to
be integrated into compulsory – state organized – guilds or agricultural
cooperatives at a local and regional level.206
In the realm of cultural policy, the platform underscored the subtle
distinction between the anti-Semitism of Elberfeld and Munich. Jews were
specifically barred from citizenship, but unlike their Munich rivals, in cases of
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mixed ancestry the heritage of the father determined an individual’s citizenship
eligibility.207 Thus, according to the proposed platform, an individual born to a
‘German’ father and a ‘Jewish’ mother would still be considered a German
citizen. Regardless, although less rabid than Munich, Elberfeld remained
obsessively anti-Semitic. Legal protections would be provided to both Catholic
and Protestant churches as well as denominational schools. Although access to
at least one non-denominational school per locality would be mandated by law.
Additionally, for citizens, access to education would be free at all levels,
combined with state subsidies for educational materials. As with industry, the
press would be subject to heavy state control, and official announcements would
only be printed in official newspapers. Private newspapers were free to remain if
they were entirely owned and edited by German citizens.208 Finally, the national
legal system was due to be extensively overhauled with an emphasis on strict
enforcement and anti-materialism.209 Although primarily focused on codifying the
foundations of National Socialism, the platform was also keenly focused on
improving propaganda. The platform suggested that propaganda efforts should
be synchronized in message and form to the greatest degree possible through
the creation of uniform propaganda organization and tools, as well as the
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exchange of party speakers across the country.210 If the new National Socialist
state was to take root, the people would have to be ceaselessly immersed in its
ideology.
In January of 1926, the twenty-five member Working Community
convened to review the proposed draft and vote on whether to forward it to party
headquarters.211 With the exception of the Munich loyalists Robert Ley and
Feder, the latter of which had arrived as Hitler’s personal emissary, the
Community voted to accept the draft.212 In addition to approving the draft, the
Community also attempted to pursue a series of political gains at the expense of
their Munich rivals. On the electoral front, the Community unanimously voted to
support the KPD led plebiscite to expropriate the property of Germany’s princes
without compensation as a means to burnish the party’s socialist credentials.213
Meanwhile, they were also prepared to strike directly at Munich’s power base.
Despite rumblings of discontent with Hitler’s leadership, the Community
reiterated their belief that they possessed no viable alternative to Hitler, but they
did not extend this olive branch to the Munich Wing. In order to diminish the
power of Munich, the Community stipulated that Gregor Strasser should be
promoted to a senior office in the party’s national headquarters. To reinforce
Strasser’s position, the Community also demanded that another Elberfeld
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disciple, Franz Pfeffer von Salomon, should assume command of the party’s
paramilitary organization, the Sturmabteilung (SA).214
Strasser and his Elberfeld allies made their demands clear. All that
remained to be seen was how exactly Hitler would handle the challenge, and
whether he would support Strasser in the battle against Munich as he had a year
prior. After engaging in a fierce rhetorical battle with the Working Community for
having the audacity to question the Twenty-Five Points, Feder promptly sought
out Hitler to expound upon the threat posed by the Community’s very
existence.215 In an ironic twist of fate, Feder was attacking the very same wing of
the party that was attempting to expand on his ideas – even if they had excluded
him from the process. For his part, Hitler had not seen a draft of the proposed
program at the time of the January meeting, and, judging by his response the
following month, it appears unlikely that he had familiarized himself with its
contents before Feder’s intervention. Hitler responded by convening a party
meeting on February 14, 1926, in the Munich wing stronghold of Bamberg to
address “important questions” facing the party.216
Heading into Bamberg, Elberfeld’s leadership believed that they stood
poised to smash Munich and reshape the party platform in their own image. In
the words of Goebbels, all they had to do was “act the part of the prudish beauty
and lure Hitler on to our territory.” Once they had Hitler on board, their victory
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was assured.217 With Munich defeated, Elberfeld could become “the Mecca of
German socialism.”218 What the Elberfeld leadership did not realize was that
Hitler harbored no interest in clarifying the ideological chaos of the National
Socialist platform; he drew his strength from his position as the ultimate arbiter of
the party’s chaotic infighting. Bamberg would rapidly set in motion the end of the
Elberfeld period for the Strasserite wing.

Hitler Intervenes: 1926
At Bamberg, the objectives of Hitler’s rebuke of the draft platform were
twofold. First, he sought to strengthen his personalist leadership by preventing
collaborative decision making from becoming normalized in the party because it
threatened to infringe on his personal power. Second, he was determined to
purge any concepts that directly conflicted with his core beliefs. In Hitler’s
estimation, alliances were purely tactical not permanent entanglements as
envisioned by the Elberfeld ideologues. Furthermore, he dismissed any alliance
with Russia on the grounds that it would lead to the fatal “political bolshevization
of Germany” and that it was necessary to “smash Bolshevism” due to its alleged
status as a “Jewish creation.”219 Likewise, he added that the living space of the
coming Reich would need to be won by conquest in eastern Europe, not the
renewed colonization of Africa or indirect domination of the continent by
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controlling a United States of Europe. In the realm of domestic affairs, Hitler
largely remained silent on the specific provisions of the draft except to dismiss its
proposed legal protections for Christian religious institutions as irrelevant and
disavow cooperation with the Communist’s expropriation plebiscite on the
grounds that it dangerously fanned the flames of class conflict.220 Finally, Hitler
mandated that the existing Twenty-Five Point program was sufficient to meet the
party’s needs and required no revision.221 Having been caught completely
unprepared by Hitler’s rejection of the platform, Gregor Strasser and Joseph
Goebbels folded with minimal resistance.
Although Elberfeld had suffered a defeat at Bamberg, the prevailing
zeitgeist in the wing remained in the words of Goebbels, “get strong and fight for
socialism.”222 Gregor concluded that Elberfeld had failed to articulate their
socialist vision clearly enough to sway Hitler to their side. Thus, he concluded
that Elberfeld’s final victory over Munich was still possible if they further
developed their socialist vision. Strasser had fundamentally misinterpreted the
causes of Hitler’s opposition to the draft platform. The problem was not that the
Elberfeld ideologues had failed to articulate their worldview. The problem was
that they had challenged foundational elements of Hitler’s personal ideology,
specifically regarding foreign policy. So long as Strasser and his colleagues
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avoided trespassing on the central pillars of Hitler’s ideology, they were free to
propose or do almost anything; but they did not yet understand this.
While eviscerating the draft platform, Hitler was careful to avoid personally
attacking either Gregor Strasser or Goebbels. In the aftermath of Bamberg, he
systematically brought Elberfeld under his authority through a combination of
coercion, charm, and personal diplomacy. Hitler’s intentions at this juncture were
not to purge the Elberfeld ideologues, but to reaffirm his central position within
the movement. The formation of working communities within or between
individual Gaus was banned and the Twenty-Five Point program was declared
“immutable.”223 That the Twenty-Five Point program was notoriously ambiguous
as a platform and in desperate need of further clarification was inconsequential to
Hitler. As he observed, “The New Testament is also full of contradictions, but that
hasn’t prevented the spread of Christianity,” National Socialism would be no
different.224 The movement would be predicated upon on its leader, not
programmatic clarity and specific policy proposals.
Having reinforced his personalist leadership style, Hitler turned his sights
on securing the continued loyalty of the Elberfeld’s most prominent proponents.
Specifically, he undertook a campaign to personally sway Goebbels to his
side.225 Goebbels, who already idolized Hitler as “half plebian, half god” proved
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an easy mark for the future Führer.226 Over the course of the year Goebbels
gradually articulated his socialist tendencies along increasingly racial lines and
completely abandoned his Soviet sympathies. By the end of 1926, Goebbels was
completely separated from his former Elberfeld allies. Likewise, other leading
members of Elberfeld’s leadership were re-assigned elsewhere, co-opted, or
reprimanded.227 Hitler eliminated the immediate threat to his power represented
by the Working Community, but in the process, promoted Elberfeld’s leaders into
even higher offices, which would come back to haunt him later.
The Working Community had failed to achieve its policy-making
objectives, but as a pressure group, it succeeded in maneuvering Elberfeld
ideologues into leading positions in the party’s national leadership.228 In keeping
with the Working Community’s demands, Hitler deposed Esser from his position
as propaganda chief and handed the office to Gregor.229 Likewise, Pfeffer von
Salomon was promoted to chief of the (SA) and held the office until he was
sacked over conflicts with Hitler about the SA’s political role in the party in
1930.230 Elberfeld’s efforts to gain control of the party’s platform had failed, but
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their leaders, specifically Gregor Strasser, had entered the highest levels of
NSDAP decision making. Despite the defeat at Bamberg, Gregor Strasser’s
influence within the party continued to grow and the socialist vision of the
movement consolidated around him.

Elberfeld Becomes the Strasserite Wing: 1926
With the other former Elberfeld leaders dispersed, or, as in Goebbels
case, ‘converted,’ the Strasser brothers, especially Gregor, enjoyed greater
control over the ideological development of their wing than ever before. This new
phase in the evolution for the socialist variant of the movement may be deemed
the Strasserite period. In the aftermath of Bamberg, both Strasser brothers
remained influential members of the NSDAP. Gregor secured national
prominence in the party as its propaganda chief. Meanwhile, Otto continued to
preside over the former Elberfeld media outlets and held significant influence
over the party in Berlin.
The first challenge facing the Strasser brothers was ideological. In order to
“get strong and fight for socialism,” the socialist platform had to be adjusted to
account for Hitler’s opposition at Bamberg. In the summer of 1926, Gregor set
about to delineate the broad strokes or “spirits” of his new economic, social, and
cultural conceptualization of National Socialism. Service to the state was exalted.
Opposition to capitalism was redoubled, and the quest for a new fascistic
conception of morality was embraced. Moreover, all discussions of foreign policy
that had so aggravated Hitler at Bamberg were jettisoned.
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In the Strasserite model, an individual’s standing in society would be
determined by the degree of their service to the state. Like other Nazi
ideologues, Strasser rejected the concept of the universal equality of man and
argued that individuals were born fundamentally unequal and should therefore
possess unequal rights and duties.”231 It was the task of the state to create a
system of natural selection to identify the strongest members of the racial
community and facilitate their entry into power. In this regard, Strasser’s goals
were identical to his Munich rivals, but he eschewed their concepts of blood tests
or race Nordicization in favor of a system of unequal electoral power determined
by national service.232 All citizens would be required to serve the state for one
year in a state labor service, during which they would also be taught a trade.
Upon completing their national service these citizens would receive the right to
vote.233 Meanwhile, military service would be open to volunteers only and would
represent the most prestigious form of state service. Only veterans would be
eligible to hold major state offices or positions within the civil service. In addition
to access to high office, veterans would be rewarded with ten votes as opposed
to the common citizen’s one.234 This system would extend to women as well, and
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wedded motherhood would be rewarded with the same voting benefits as military
service.235
Opposition to capitalism was redoubled in favor of anti-materialist
socialism organized along staunchly corporatist lines. Capitalism was seen as
reducing the value of individuals to their accumulated wealth, instead of their
contribution to society.236 In Gregor’s mind, the destruction of the capitalist
system and the creation of a new social order based on national service would
naturally lay the foundations for a new economic system based on profit and
property sharing for the nation’s workers.237 Otto expanded on this concept
further by advocating the formation of self-governing occupational guilds to
oversee each administrative, economic, legal, and cultural profession in the
Reich.238 Although ‘self-governing’ in their internal operations, these guilds would
be directed at a national level by a centralized corporatist state. The occupational
guilds would function as administrative and regulatory units within their
respective occupations, provide an additional system for training new leaders,
and serve as the primary link between the average citizen and the state.
Previous “indirect” connections between citizen and state such as party affiliation
and provincial governments would be rendered obsolete.239 In essence, Otto
simply recycled the thinking behind the Chambers of Corporations of the old draft
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platform, but his motivations for doing so demand further analysis. Otto identified
the Italian fascist state as too authoritarian and overly reliant on “orders from
above.” Simultaneously, he chided both Italian fascism and Soviet Communism
for excessively fixating on fostering idolatry toward the state.240 Given the nearly
unlimited exaltation of the state in Strasserite thinking, such contentions were
clearly hypocritical in the extreme, but they still served a purpose. In the
Strasserite model, this combination of occupational self-governance and
centralized Reich level decision making was seen as a means to lend individual
citizens a tangible stake in the corporatist system.
The implicitly illiberal electoral politics of Strasserite thinking and its sharp
critique of Italian fascism highlights a subtle but crucial point of interest in the
development of National Socialism after Bamberg. Beyond consolidating his
personal power, Hitler had taken no steps to clarify the structure of a theoretical
Nazi state. Even the concept of the Führer cult and its doppelganger, the leader
principle, so essential to the shape and form of the future Third Reich, were still
not fully formed until 1927.241 The fundamental ambiguity of the party’s platform
that led Gregor Strasser to form the northern Working Community in the first
place remained undiminished. Banning working communities solidified Hitler’s
power, but the Strasser brothers simply continued to flesh-out their interpretation
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of the movement through other means. A future crisis with Hitler was
unavoidable.

Building a National Party Structure: 1926-1928
Hitler’s appointment of Gregor Strasser as the party’s propaganda chief
was typical of his leadership style. Hitler possessed an excellent understanding
of how propaganda should function, but he would leave it to others to lend these
ideas organizational form.242 Gregor Strasser’s tenure as the party’s propaganda
chief from September of 1926 to January 1928 coordinated the gradual
consolidation of the NSDAP’s national party structure, and the standardization of
its most successful forms of propaganda. From his position as propaganda chief
Gregor aggressively pursued the centralization and standardization of national
propaganda efforts. A vertical command structure was introduced for
propaganda, connecting local propaganda sections to the office of the national
propaganda chief. Speaking tours by the party’s most potent speakers were
planned and prepared well in advance to maximize the national exposure of a
comparatively small pool of personnel.243 With the structure of a coherent
national propaganda network in place, Gregor attempted to use his new position
to enforce his socialist platform on party propaganda policy nationwide.
Unsurprisingly, Gregor’s ideological initiatives were met with stiff resistance from
his Munich rivals; consequently, the party’s ideology remained blurred and
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fractious.244 Characteristically, Hitler stood aloof from the ongoing feud between
the Strasserite national propaganda leadership and the Munich party
establishment.
Despite Gregor’s persistent struggle with the Munich establishment over
ideological content, he oversaw the standardization of the forms of propaganda
for which the NSDAP would become infamous. In 1927, Strasser’s propaganda
office published its first standardized propaganda handbook for use by party
officials across the country. Regardless of what ideological message an
individual Gauleiter desired to convey, the form of propaganda would be the
same. Strasser’s handbook delineated official formats for party meetings,
festivals, celebrations, demonstrations, and rituals. It dictated specific guidelines
for event organization, advertisement, and security. Finally, the handbook
outlined specific sacred National Socialist dates, including the anniversary of the
Beerhall Putsch and Hitler’s birthday.245 The foremost priority of Strasser’s
propaganda department was to create an alternative National Socialist reality
steeped in ritual, portraying Hitler as a political messiah.246 The foundational
ideas behind this alternate reality originated with Hitler, but Gregor Strasser was
the man who gave them organizational form. Due to the party’s fragile financial
state, shortage of manpower, and its reliance on the whims of individual

244

Childers, The Third Reich, 92.
Childers, The Third Reich, 93-94.
246 Childers, The Third Reich, 93, 96.
245

94

Gauleiter at the local level, it would take time for the new structure to take effect
in all regions, but definitive steps towards a uniformity had been achieved.247
By the end of 1927, the NSDAP’s propaganda machine had been vastly
improved, but the party’s organizational structure remained chaotic. Individual
Gauleiter enjoyed virtual autonomy and forwarded membership dues paid to their
Gaus to party headquarters in Munich infrequently.248 Moreover, Gau boundaries
did not correspond to Reichstag electoral districts, leading to infighting between
Gauleiter and needless duplication of effort during election campaigns. Party
headquarters lacked concrete mechanisms to enforce its will on the Gaus and
the party was chronically short on funds at the national level. Although the
NSDAP was still a small fringe party, it was blatantly obvious that it required
comprehensive restructuring before it could evolve into a serious national
movement. With the elections of May 1928 looming on the horizon, Hitler decided
that it was time to act. In January of 1928, Gregor Strasser was transferred to the
role of Reichsorganisationsleiter, the de-facto general secretary of the NSDAP.
Strasser’s victory in Gau reform represented a watershed moment in the
evolution of National Socialism. The NSDAP was no longer a party of semiautonomous local chapters united only by zealous devotion to a charismatic
leader; it was in the process of becoming a centralized national political party.
From 1929 to 1930, Gregor solidified his grip over the party through a series of
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reforms designed to centralize authority around his office of organizational chief
or Reichsorganisationsleiter (ROL).249 A coherent national command structure
with clearly defined jurisdictions at every level was created, alongside new
regulations to force personnel to follow proper channels to register complaints,
requests, and suggestions.250 Even more importantly, the new command
structure strengthened the party’s fiscal control over its constituent Gaus, vastly
strengthening the party’s hand at the national level. During the winter of 1929
Strasser solidified his reforms with the creation nine senior departments with
sweeping power to shape and regulate party policy across the nation.
Department I functioned as the party’s main office, under the direct control of
Gregor. Department II was charged with formulating the structures and policies of
the future National Socialist state. Department III oversaw education and the
national press office, Department IV the economy, Department V agriculture,
Department VI the National Socialist Factory Cell Organization (NSBO),
Department VII Civil Servants, Department VIII Women’s Affairs, and finally
Department IX Care of War Victims.251
The new party structure was designed to function as a shadow state. In
these reforms, nearly every aspect of the Republic, save the military, possessed
a direct corollary under Strasser’s control. Department II is particularly revealing
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in this regard. To quote its mission statement, as recommended by Gregor
Strasser, Department II was tasked with “collating, studying, and clarifying all
matters concerning the development of the movement and the National Socialist
concept of state.”252 The Department was further divided into a panoply of subdepartments tasked with formulating legal, social, and economic policies for the
future National Socialist state. As part of its efforts to construct the edifices of the
future Reich, Department II actively cultivated ties with specialists and politicians
outside the NSDAP – Strasser’s influence increasingly extended far beyond the
confines of the Nazi party.253 The same logic was applied to the NSBO in
Department VI, which openly recruited non-party members into its ranks and
which became a stronghold of socialist activism within the party until it was
purged in 1934. The formation of Department II, and the deliberate efforts to
cultivate ties to powerbrokers beyond the party represented a crucial
breakthrough for Gregor Strasser. Through Department II, he successfully
circumvented Hitler’s ban on Working Communities by forming a new one
protected by the aegis of the party organization. While he and the rest of the Nazi
party feverishly worked to destroy the Weimar Republic, Gregor Strasser was
laying the foundation for a new state built in his own ideological image.
Gregor’s comprehensive restructuring of the NSDAP establishment
coincided with the party’s entry onto the center-stage of national politics as a
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result of the Great Depression. Following the stock market collapse in October
1929, the NSDAP grew at an unprecedented rate, and the newly re-organized
Nazi party establishment was well equipped to handle the sudden influx of new
members. As the party approached real power, old rivalries returned to the fore.
Otto Strasser was headed for a direct confrontation with Hitler as well as
Goebbels, and the fallout threatened to expose the rifts of Bamberg once again.

The Otto Strasser Crisis: 1930
The roots of the Otto’s dissent were two-fold. The first was a matter of
ideological conflict between Otto and Hitler, and the second was a practical
struggle over power in Berlin between Otto and Goebbels. On the ideological
front, Otto had been a thorn in Hitler’s side for years. In the aftermath of
Bamberg, he remained un-swayed and continued to publicly agitate for reform of
the party program, despite the formal injunctions against questioning the
‘immutable’ Twenty-Five Points.254 Furthermore, Otto was the more radical
socialist of the two Strasser brothers. He possessed close ties to the
revolutionary left and had always viewed Hitler as a means to a revolutionary
end. In Otto’s view, the new Reich could only be created by converting their
German Marxist cousins to the National Socialist cause. From this perspective,
Hitler’s policy of Legality was seen as betraying the socialist vision in favor of
bourgeois reaction.255 Like his elder brother, Otto never sycophantically
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embraced the Führer cult, but unlike Gregor he was willing to publicly defy Hitler
and even criticize him using the party’s own Kampf Verlag – which he
controlled.256 Consequently, Otto’s dissent and the platform he possessed to
propagate it represented a potential ideological threat to Hitler and a direct
challenge to his legitimacy as leader.
Thus, separating the Strasser brothers and isolating Otto became a matter
of political importance to Hitler. He struck his first blow in June of 1926, by
replacing Otto Strasser’s close ally and Gauleiter of Berlin Ernst Schlange with
Joseph Goebbels. Consequently, Goebbels and Otto remained locked in a battle
for influence over the city for the next four years.257 In 1928, Hitler ratcheted up
the pressure on Otto further by purging his remaining allies among the ranks of
the Gauleiter en masse. Yet, despite repeatedly promising Goebbels that Otto
would be expelled, Hitler hesitated to take decisive action against Otto himself.258
During the summer of 1930, as the party’s membership exploded across the
nation and Gregor’s reforms established a centralized national party, the Otto
Strasser crisis finally reached its crescendo. Using Kampf Verlag as his platform,
Otto openly admonished Hitler’s retreat from the right-wing coalition against the
Young Plan in defiance of a direct order from the Führer. Once again, Hitler
threatened to expel Otto, but once again he did nothing.259 Instead, it was Otto
who seized the initiative. In July, he confidently proclaimed, “the socialists are
256
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leaving the NSDAP” and left to form his own splinter party, taking his publishing
assets with him.260 In the aftermath of Otto’s departure, Gregor hastily distanced
himself from his brother’s actions, re-affirmed his loyalty to Hitler and carried on
in his role as ROL unimpeded.261 Despite determined efforts by Goebbels to
convince Hitler to dispose of Gregor, Hitler took no actions against his powerful
ROL.

Zenith and Confrontation with Hitler: 1930-1932
It may be tempting to declare that the departure of Otto Strasser
represented the death of the socialist variant of Nazism, but this would be
inaccurate in the extreme. Otto and his confederates had left, but Gregor
Strasser had firmly established himself as the second man in the party, with
sweeping power over the movement’s ideology and structure. The Strasserite
wing of the movement and Gregor Strasser’s political sphere of influence,
became one in the same. Moreover, unlike Hitler, who abhorred cooperation
beyond the NSDAP, Gregor’s influence would be felt far beyond the confines of
the party, and it would be precisely this that would ultimately lead to his downfall
and death.

Otto Strasser, qtd. Moreau, “Otto Strasser: Nationalist Socialism,” 238. After leaving the
NSDAP Otto Strasser formed a competing party known as the Kampfgemeinschaft
Revolutionärer Nationalsozialisten (KGRNS) or Combat League of Revolutionary National
Socialists dedicated to a radical socialist interpretation of National Socialism. Otto’s new party
was rocked by tensions between national socialist and national bolshevist factions and was never
able to mount a credible challenge to the NSDAP.
261 Kershaw, Hitler: Hubris, 328.
260

100

Following the Otto Strasser crisis, Gregor’s power continued to grow
unabated. Over the next two years, he expanded the reach of the ROL and
further centralized its chain of command around himself. National inspections
were introduced to ensure that individual Gaus complied with the policies set by
Strasser’s party organization. State inspectors were appointed with sweeping
regulatory powers over the Gaus assigned to them. Standing above the state
inspectors were a pair of national inspectors; a close personal ally, Paul Schultz,
in the north and east and staunch Munich loyalist, Robert Ley, in the south and
west. Finally, Gregor Strasser functioned as the penultimate bureaucratic
authority in the party.262 Gregor was now unambiguously second only to Hitler
himself. Given the Führer’s chronic disinterest in organizational affairs, Strasser
effectively functioned as the sole manager of the party’s daily operations. His
growing monopoly on organizational power was most evident in his tight control
of legislative proposals. All proposed legislation from the local level all the way to
the Reichstag was required to be submitted for Gregor’s personal review and
approval before these could be deployed. Moreover, a special office was set up
within the ROL to draft national legislation and manage the party’s Reichstag
delegation by assigning specialists from the ROL to specific representatives.
Finally, individual party functionaries were banned from unilaterally drafting
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propaganda or discussing economic policy with the press without the consent of
Strasser’s party organization.263
Strasser’s growing influence was felt in virtually every aspect of the party.
As his power grew, he carefully positioned himself to shape any potential
transition from party establishment to national government. To support this goal,
Gregor commissioned the creation of official papers published by each of the
ROL’s senior departments to serve as propaganda outlets directly under his
control. Likewise, a myriad of party-run leagues, associations, and social clubs
were created as tools to gradually integrate all aspects of society into a
corporatist state structure following the party’s rise to power.264 The greatest
breakthrough in Strasser’s campaign to create a corporatist regime in waiting
came from his subordinates in the party’s labor union, the Nationalsozialistische
Betriebszellenorganisation (NSBO) led by Reinhold Muchow. By emulating
communist factory cell organization and mixing it with the ideological framework
of Strasserite corporatism, the NSBO made tangible inroads into the socialist
strongholds of the working class. The NSBO’s objectives as part of the
Strasserite wing were twofold. First, the NSBO sought to “reshape the
extraordinarily complicated social-political machinery of the state and economy
according to our National Socialist ideology.”265 Second, they endeavored to
“chain them [the German people] to our organization so that they can really
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become agents of our will.”266 The NSBO formed the revolutionary vanguard of
Strasserite National Socialism, and the organization was aware of where its
allegiances resided; Gregor Strasser and not Hitler was its idol. The first step in
enmeshing Germany’s workers into a National Socialist corporatist state was well
underway, and it answered to Strasser.267 While the NSBO served as a
Strasserite vanguard in German society, Strasser’s sprawling network of
connections within government, trade unions, and the economy stemming from
Senior Department II and influence in the Reichstag, rendered him a key power
broker in national politics.268
With his position within the party thoroughly solidified, Strasser turned his
attention to the Nazi’s final, and seemingly most impermeable obstacle – gaining
power. The Weimar system was teetering on the brink of collapse, but the
powerful reactionary-right in German politics remained wary of Hitler’s objectives.
In March, Hitler’s bid for the presidency was decisively defeated by Hindenburg.
In July, the NSDAP swept Reichstag elections and established itself as the
largest party in the nation, but Hitler’s subsequent effort to demand the office of
Chancellor from Hindenburg was met with outright rejection. The NSDAP had
arrived at the edge of power, but it could not complete the conquest of the state
alone – it needed allies. Specifically, it needed to sway the reactionary or center-
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right to its side. By fall of 1932, it had become apparent that Hitler’s zealous
refusal to co-operate with any other party had driven the NSDAP into crisis.
Popular support was falling rapidly. The propaganda machine teetered on the
brink of collapse, and die-hard revolutionaries within the SA called for the
rejection of the policy of legality in favor of violent revolution.269 Hitler had played
his hand and failed to achieve victory. The NSDAP required new tactics if it was
to conquer the state without outside assistance. Regardless, faced with this
precarious political situation, Hitler clung to the hope that the fanatical devotion of
the movement’s true-believers and relentless propaganda alone would carry the
party to power.270 As the shortcomings of Hitler’s all or nothing policy became
apparent, Strasser seized the initiative and attempted to bring the party into
power through his vast network of political connections beyond the NSDAP. In
his efforts to bring the party into power, Strasser’s autonomy was met with
suspicion and hostility from Hitler and his inner circle. Still, Strasser remained
convinced that the growing rift was entirely the work of Hitler’s entourage, and
that he could win Hitler over in time. Strasser was repeating the same mistakes
that had led to his defeat at Bamberg in 1925, he failed to understand that Hitler
would never share power.
Early in the spring of 1932, Strasser used his monopoly over the party’s
organization to extend his influence over Nazi economic policy. Harnessing the
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theories and proposals of his extensive network of contacts originating from
Senior Department II, the Reichstag, as well as the grassroots support of the
NSBO, he began to formulate the specifics of a national economic recovery
program and made his new policies binding on the party establishment.271 His
economic platform was Keynesian in its form and function. The primary objective
was to jump-start the economy through extensive public works projects intended
to shift citizens off unemployment benefits back into the labor market; thereby
resuscitating consumption and catalyzing economic growth. This undertaking
would be financed by a combination of reducing unemployment payments by
returning citizens to work, taxing income, payments from beneficiaries of public
works, and most importantly, a strong central bank advancing credit to underwrite
economic recovery.272 None of these concepts were original to Strasser. He had
adapted them from the recommendations of his panels of experts, and this
underscored the central difference between Hitler and Strasser’s leadership
strategies. Strasser adapted the proposals of specialists and incorporated them
into his political program – even if those specialists originated outside the party.
Conversely, Hitler valued ideological zeal and personal allegiance to himself
above all technical qualifications. Strasser first deployed his new economic
platform as an integral part of the Nazi parliamentary victory of July 1932. Then,
following on the heels of Hitler’s failure to secure the Chancellery from
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Hindenburg in August, Strasser explored the possibility of a coalition with centerright Zentrum, using his economic platform as the central policy plank of the
alliance. Zentrum leadership was receptive to the idea, and Strasser offered to
“throw himself into the breach” of government if Hitler was unwilling to do it
himself.273 Still, Hitler remained wed to his all-or-nothing strategy – there would
be no parliamentary coalition compromise. With the parliamentary path to power
blocked, the rift between Strasser and Hitler became increasingly acrimonious.
The tension between the two men was further enflamed by Hitler’s dramatic
reversal regarding Strasser’s economic policy. In September, Hitler dissolved the
political economy section of the party organization and banned the distribution of
the party’s Strasserite Economic Emergency Program, owing to personal
disagreements regarding its conciliatory rhetoric regarding labor unions.274
Hitler and Strasser were both ardent National Socialists, but their
divergent perspectives as to how the movement should enter power and radically
different views on the party’s place in broader German politics were
irreconcilable. Strasser predicted that if coalition solutions predicated on a strong
NSDAP-led economic policy were not pursued, popular support for the party
would soon decline.275 His fears were widely shared among the party’s rank and
file. As early as August, internal reports from Goebbels’ propaganda office
identified Hitler’s refusal to enter government as a major source of disaffection
Gregor Strasser, qtd. Kissenkoetter, “Gregor Strasser: Nazi Party Organizer,” 232. See also
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among party members.276 The NSDAP’s sharp reversal during the November
1932 Reichstag election lent credence to predictions of the party’s impending
decline. The devastating loss of 40% of the NSDAP’s electoral share in
Thuringian state elections the following month seemed to further confirm the
magnitude of the crisis.277 Popular opinion was turning against the Nazis, and
Strasser’s reward for correctly predicting the reversals of November was his
exclusion from Hitler’s inner decision making circle.278 As the party approached
ruin, tensions between Hitler and Strasser reached a breaking point. The NSDAP
was nearly bankrupt. Its support was waning. Morale was plummeting, and Hitler
offered no clear plan to achieve victory. Under his all-or-nothing policy, the
NSDAP was following the same path that had broken the back of the DNVP. In
the face of this crisis, Strasser identified what he believed to be the movement’s
last best chance to seize power. He proposed to enter government as the
primary parliamentary support for a Reichswehr backed authoritarian regime led
by the incoming Chancellor, General Kurt von Schleicher.
Although General Schleicher maneuvered in reactionary circles
surrounding President Hindenburg, he was a pragmatic power-seeker, not a
reactionary. Schleicher espoused a strongly corporatist world view predicated
upon combining the forces of industry, labor, and the military to form an
authoritarian “third-way” government. The key difference between Strasser and
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Schleicher rested in their motives. Strasser believed Schleicher’s regime
presented an opportunity for the Nazis to demonstrate their governing credentials
and re-center the political mainstream on the party.279 In short, Strasser was
proposing a revolution from inside the system. Schleicher secretly believed he
could divide and conquer the Nazi party by splitting it and incorporating the
Strasserite faction within his new regime, whilst marginalizing Hitler in the
process.280 Schleicher’s new authoritarian government would be founded upon
Strasser’s economic platform, the Nazi party’s popular support, labor unions, and
the coercive power of the army. Despite the NSDAP’s precarious situation, Hitler
characteristically refused to compromise or to enter government to attempt to
subvert the regime from within. Instead, he regarded Strasser’s actions as
tantamount to treason. In his analysis of the Schleicher-Strasser negotiations,
Hitler wildly misjudged the motivations of his ROL.
Regardless of Schleicher’s objectives, there is no credible evidence that
Strasser intended to split the party. Had this been his intention, then he logically
would have done so when handed a golden opportunity by Hitler during the
ensuing showdown between the two men precipitated by the negotiations. When
Schleicher was prepared to seal the deal, he offered the vice-chancellorship to
Strasser, who in turn immediately sought Hitler’s approval.281 With upwards of
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one-hundred NSDAP Reichstag representatives and twelve Gauleiter backing
him, on December 5th Strasser made one final effort to sway Hitler. When that
failed, he tendered his resignation, implored his colleagues within the party not to
follow him out, and then retired from politics.282 Hitler accused Strasser of
treason and responded to his organizational chief’s resignation by threatening to
commit suicide for fear that Strasser’s departure would precipitate the party’s
collapse.283 In the wake of Strasser’s departure, his empire was divided between
Robert Ley and Rudolf Hess. The network of national party inspectors
disbanded, and the party organization was reshuffled to favor Hitler loyalists.284
Elements of Strasserite ideology and organizational structure persisted into the
nascent Nazi state, but Strasserites had lost their previously considerable
influence in the party. To quote Strasser, Germany was “in the hands of an
Austrian [Hitler] who is a congenital liar, a former officer [Röhm] who is a pervert,
and a clubfoot [Goebbels]” whom he described as “Satan in human form.”285
While Strasser remained disengaged from politics, Hitler and his inner circle
obsessed over conspiracy theories involving supposed Strasserite plots to
destabilize the party.286 Gregor Strasser had become National Socialism’s Leon
Trotsky, and Hitler was haunted by the prospect that sometime, somehow, his
former organizational chief might topple him.
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Strasser’s resignation played a crucial, albeit, indirect role in delivering the
Nazis to power just six weeks later. The failure of Schleicher’s bid to split the
Nazi party left the chancellor vulnerable to his arch-rival, Franz von Papen.287 At
the same time, the only politician in Germany who could offer Papen the base he
needed to completely topple Schleicher was Hitler, and an arrangement was
hastily reached to bring Hitler into government as chancellor with Papen as vice
chancellor. Thus, the Nazis came into government without a secure
parliamentary majority as senior partners in a tenuous coalition with Papen and
his reactionary allies.288 The sudden and initially incomplete nature of the Nazi
ascent raised more questions than answers about how to accomplish total
‘synchronization’ of society with the party.289 While the SA unleashed a reign of
terror across the country designed to quash political opposition, the Nazis still
lacked a clear vision of how to engineer their new state. The only consensus was
that the German people and state should be made to merge with Nazism and not
the other way around. National Socialism possessed a collection of concepts and
policies, but how these might coalesce into a governing system remained
unclear. The ambiguity of the moment primarily favored Hitler, enabling his
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lieutenants to carve the state into bureaucratic fiefdoms pursuing his ‘vision’ in
their own distinct ways, but the chaos also empowered other National Socialist
agendas in conflict with the newly minted Führer. To firmly grasp the importance
of Hitler’s growing hegemony over the party’s ideology, it is necessary to
examine Hitler’s personal variant of National Socialism and its profound
implications for German politics and society once it became fully institutionalized.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
CORE PRINCIPLES OF HITLER’S IDEOLOGY
“If I can accept a divine commandment, it’s this one: ‘Thou shalt
preserve the species.’”290 -Adolf Hitler

The core of Hitler’s personal variant of National Socialism was based on
three intertwined principles: conquering new living space, maintaining racial
purity, and achieving economic autarky. For Hitler, life was an endless struggle
between races over finite resources. Consequently, he conceived races as
unitary entities struggling for survival like beasts in the wilderness, and the price
of failure was extinction.291 This radically Darwinian worldview shaped every
aspect of his personal ideology. In his mind, politics was nothing more than the
art of a race’s struggle for survival. Foreign policy was the art of securing living
space through warfare and alliance building in order to facilitate conquest.
Domestic policy was entirely devoted to providing the racially pure manpower
and ideological indoctrination to wage war to procure living space.292 Hitler’s
economic policies were an extension of this thinking. He sought autarky to
ensure self-sufficiency in weapon and food production to prosecute his wars. 293
In his mind, the battle for racial survival through conquest and the maintenance
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of racial purity were one in the same. States were only strong as long as they
were racially homogeneous; the moment purity was lost, the capability to
conquer new living space and, therefore, support a growing population would be
lost as well. Weapons, technology, and training were of tertiary importance
compared to the maintenance of racial purity.294 This fixation on purity also
surfaced in his quest for autarky. At a pragmatic level, autarky promised to
enable Hitler to create an industrial engine to prosecute his wars for living space.
While at an ideological level, Hitler simultaneously argued that capitalist free
trade was a front for a “peaceful economic war” waged by Britain, and that
Germany should close itself off from the international system as a means to
preserve racial purity.295
Understanding these concepts is the key to analyzing Hitler’s role in
shaping the Third Reich. While the Strasserites and, to a lesser extent, the early
Munich wing sought to create an ideology with which to govern, Hitler desired to
create an ideology to facilitate conquest. He remained entirely focused upon the
acquisition of living space, racial purification, and autarky. How his oligarchs
implemented his wishes was of no concern to him, as long as they did not
deviate from these core goals. Thus, Hitler’s personal variant of National
Socialism remained “thin” in that it was based on a restricted core of highly
specific goals, but it was by no means simple or inconsequential. On the
Hitler, Hitler’s Second Book, 29, 31-33.
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contrary, the thin core of Hitler’s National Socialism shaped much of the behavior
of National Socialism in power.
To support his core principles of conquest, purity, and autarky, he adapted
a range of ideas drawn from both traditional and socialist völkisch trends within
his personal ideology. From traditional völkisch ideologues Hitler adapted his
conceptualizations of racial nationalism, anti-Semitism, Slavophobia, antiInternationalism, and agrarian romanticism. Moreover, he demonstrated
significant ideological overlap with Munich’s concept of the völkisch state in his
conceptualization of German identity and citizenship. He conceptualized
membership in the German volkschgemeinschaft as exclusively based on blood,
so no racial outsider could be assimilated.296 Therefore, non-ethnic German
elements within society were deemed alien and targeted for isolation or
expulsion.297 Building on his antipathy for perceived foreign influence, he lashed
out against Jews, Marxists, and even Catholics as symbols of internationalism.
To Hitler, any community that crossed national boundaries, be it an ethnic group,
ideology, or religion, constituted an international conspiracy aimed at debasing
German racial purity.298 Following the lead of many völkisch traditionalists, he
extended this obsession with purity to rural versus urban life. He regarded
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agrarian life as inherently pure and cities as hotbeds of vice, race-mixing,
pacifism, and Jewish habitation – all of which he regarded as threats to a nation’s
ability to conquer new living space.299 Thus, a Reich could only remain
successful if it ‘returned’ the bulk of its people to a pure agrarian lifestyle. In this
worldview, expanding Germany’s peasantry was necessary for exploiting newly
conquered living space and safeguarding his empire against Jews, whom he
believed were incapable of productive labor, and therefore, unable to sustain
themselves in agricultural life.300
Meanwhile, Hitler simultaneously borrowed right-wing socialist elements of
völkisch ideology, but he invariably modified these concepts to suit his racial
nationalist agenda. Moreover, Hitler’s adaptation of right-wing socialist elements
displays a distinct lack of Strasserite influence; his socialist elements were
entirely derived from pre-Strasserite völkisch socialists. Among the themes he
adapted from völkisch socialists were anti-capitalism, military socialism, and a
variety of anti-bourgeois sentiments. Although he embraced industrialization as a
tool to produce weapons of war, he staunchly opposed capitalism itself as an
internationalist blight upon society. He argued that capitalism undermined a
nation’s willingness to wage wars of expansion and facilitated race-mixing
through international trade.301 He was not intrinsically opposed to private
enterprise, as evinced by his symbiotic relationship with military industrialists, but
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he was only willing to tolerate private industry when it served his autarkic
economic goals. At the same time, he was by no means wed to private
enterprise. He had no qualms about allowing virtually all civilian industries to be
brought under state supervision through the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German
Labor Front, or DAF), and allowed the creation of gargantuan state industries in
elements of the defense establishment as part of his quest for autarky. 302
Additionally, Hitler accepted Spengler’s narrative that the German military
of the Second Reich functioned as an anti-materialist, non-Marxist, socialist
institution based on military merit, thus providing a model for the future Reich. He
combined this right-wing socialist interpretation of the role of the military with his
racial nationalism and argued that if applied to society as a whole, military
meritocracy would immunize Germany against both the privations of capitalism
and so-called “Jewish dangers.”303 Building on this narrative, he characterized
himself as a socialist based on shared racial identity, instead of class identity.304
He embraced the concepts of right-wing socialism, but he did so exclusively
through a racial nationalist lens. In his mind, the concept of class was itself
fleeting and irrelevant; racial identity and racial collectivism were all that
mattered.305 As a part of his campaign to socialize Germany along racial lines,
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the bourgeoisie would necessarily be cast out of power and marginalized. For
Hitler, the bourgeoisie were an antagonistic force tainted by racial miscegenation
and excessive materialism.306 Even nationalist bourgeois politicians were
considered by Hitler to be stooges of capitalism and therefore, incapable of
understanding the necessity of conquering new living space.307 For all the
attention that has been lavished on Hitler’s courtship of the bourgeois far-right as
part of his policy of legality, he never trusted nor admired them. They offered a
means to an end, and he was willing to tone down his rhetoric against them for
electoral purposes from 1928-1932, but once the Nazi regime was firmly
established, he turned on them without hesitation.
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CHAPTER SIX:
RISE TO POWER AND THE HITLER PERIOD
The party’s ascent to power had the effect of centralizing Nazi ideology
around Hitler and providing him with an unparalleled platform to institutionalize
his variant of National Socialism. Until 1933, the NSDAP’s thickening process
was driven by Munich and Strasserite ideologues pursuing their own competing
versions of the ideology. After 1933, this changed. From this point forward the
idea that party ideology and policies should be based on making Hitler’s
worldview a reality became the bedrock of National Socialism.308 Concepts
developed during the Munich and Strasserite periods were not abandoned, but
their application within governance was shaped by their compatibility with Hitler’s
preferences. This process was not instantaneous, however. Before Hitler could
consolidate personal hegemony over Nazi ideology, the party would have to be
purged of any elements espousing variations of National Socialism that conflicted
with his own.

The Ideological Foundation of the Third Reich
The ideological foundation of the Third Reich was based on four core
concepts. First, the völkisch state, which underpinned all governing institutions
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and imbued policy making with racial nationalist themes at all levels. The second
was an adapted variant of Strasserite corporatism stripped of its overtly
Strasserite rhetoric and critically articulated in a form fully compatible with the
völkisch state. The third was the concept of the Führer principle, which was
recapitulated across society from the factory floor to Hitler himself. These first
three concepts configured the structure and operation of the state. This Nazi
state was race-based, it used corporatist structures, and with all decision making
based on the Führer principle. The fourth and final core concept was that all
policies should serve to further Hitler’s conjoined concepts of racial purity,
conquest, and autarky. After the purges of 1933 and 1934, the implementation of
Hitler’s personal ideology became the overarching goal of Nazi state policy. In
early 1933 however, Hitler’s monopoly over the party’s ideology was not yet
absolute, and he still needed to eliminate his remaining internal rivals before the
state could be completely harnessed towards achieving his objectives. Due to
their ideological proximity, the Munich wing posed no challenge to Hitler, but the
remaining Strasserites and revolutionary elements of the SA entertaining socialist
aspirations posed very real competitors.

Strasserite Hold-Outs and the Genesis of Synthesis
The remnants of the Strasserite wing lacked a unifying leader, but its
constituent elements remained influential. Strasserite functionaries pervaded the
party’s organizational structure and strongly influenced the Reich’s early
economic planning. These Strasserites however, posed little threat to Hitler, as
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their interests were technocratic and their economic proposals complimented his
re-armament ambitions. These technocrats devised the twin “Reinhardt
Programs” that jump-started the German economy through a work creation and
infrastructure development program structurally akin to the American New
Deal.309 The Reinhardt Programs were based on plans developed a year prior by
a combination of Strasser’s economic proposals, industrialists, trade unionists,
and political-economy technocrats in the party organization.310 With domestic
economic stability secured by the Reinhardt Programs, Hitler was free to embark
on a series of massive rearmament campaigns that further revitalized the
German economy.311 In an ironic twist of fate, Strasser had helped create the
economic policies that played a decisive role in stabilizing the Nazi state that
subsequently destroyed him.
Not all Strasserites in the party organization could be easily pacified. The
expansive and fiercely socialist NSBO continued to agitate for the total reordering of German society along Strasserite corporatist lines and in his efforts to
solidify the party’s grip on the nation, Hitler indirectly empowered his internal
rivals in the NSBO. In May of 1933, Hitler dissolved the country’s labor unions
and transferred their assets to a new party-run Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF) led
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by Robert Ley, who simultaneously functioned as the party’s post-Strasser
organizational chief. The labor unions were gone, but what would follow in their
wake, and how labor would be integrated into the new regime remained unclear.
Neither Hitler nor Ley possessed a clear plan as to the form or function of the
new DAF – only that "the former form of worker representation could not be
maintained in the future."312
In lieu of any clear plan the course of events turned in favor of NSBO
leadership who attempted to harness the newly created DAF as a tool to create a
Strasserite corporatist state. Under the auspices of the DAF, all unions, their
membership rosters, and publishing assets were subsumed into the NSBO. The
former unions were further grouped into five pillars representing different aspects
of German economic life with each pillar administered by an NSBO commissar.
The DAF presided over this corporatist super-organization, but its senior
personnel were overwhelmingly drawn from the NSBO. In total, the DAF’s
bureaucracy comprised 13 state, 361 regional or local labor offices, as well as a
number of attendant bureaucracies to oversee a panoply of integrated education,
leadership training, youth, propaganda, and economic organizations. 313 In the
view of NSBO leadership, the DAF would serve as a nation-wide umbrella
organization with which to make the German people “agents of our will.” 314 Ley
further extended the role of the DAF by empowering it to preside over social
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policy as well; there would be no walk of life left beyond the umbrella of the
DAF.315 With a few crucial amendments discussed later in this chapter, this
corporatist structure subsequently became one of the preeminent institutions of
the Nazi system until the outbreak of World War Two – although not all of its
founders lived to see it.
Despite Ley’s active involvement in NSBO initiatives and his efforts to
direct its activities as the head of the DAF, the situation rapidly spiraled out of his
control. At the national level of the DAF, officials began issuing directives on all
manner of socio-economic policies ranging from equal pay for female workers to
vacation and wage policy.316 This inundation of executive labor decrees
burnished the party’s socialist credentials to the masses, but they were
uncoordinated and proved unsettling to conservative elites whom the party could
not yet push aside. Meanwhile, at the local level NSBO personnel disrupted the
operation of government bureaucracies, extorted employers, and flouted orders
from party officials. Even more troubling to the party’s elites, banned Communist
and Social Democratic labor unions were using the NSBO’s open recruitment
policy as camouflage for continuing their independent organizations.317 In an
effort to assert control over the situation, the NSBO’s leader, Muchow, responded
by expelling 100,000 members from the organization and issuing a number of
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decrees designed to inhibit free-lance activism by the organization’s rank and
file.318
The confusion surrounding the early actions of the DAF/NSBO was typical
of the first year of Nazi governance more generally. Similar dynamics unfolded
within the paramilitary SA, but in the case of the SA, the oligarch presiding over
the process (Ernst Röhm) was willing and able to challenge Hitler.319 Across the
party, zealots and opportunists took it upon themselves to settle scores, forcefully
usurp the reigns of governance, and influence the policies of the new state in the
name of ‘synchronization.’ Meanwhile, Hitler’s lieutenants, such as Ley in the
case of the DAF, fashioned these grassroots efforts into National Socialist
institutions and jealously guarded them as private political fiefdoms against
encroachment by other Nazis. Moreover, the party’s revolutionary aspirations
were further complicated by the persistence of the Weimar bureaucracy and the
party’s continued reliance on the acquiescence of traditional elites. Amidst this
administrative chaos, all manner of competing factions and actors within the
NSDAP vied to shape the emerging state, and it remained to be seen how the
‘final’ form of Nazi governance would operate. During the first year of the Third
Reich, the Strasserite NSBO simply proved more effective at implementing its
version of National Socialism than most of its competitors. All of this would,
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however, soon change; the NSBO was pushing an agenda that directly conflicted
with Hitler.

The Muchow Purge: September 1933
In an effort to stabilize the regime by restoring a sense of political
normality in the wake of the tumultuous transition of power, Hitler declared that
the National Socialist revolution was “over” in June of 1933. The announcement
pushed tensions between the NSBO and Hitler beyond the breaking point. NSBO
personnel across the country retaliated by occupying factories, harassing
businessmen, fighting with Hitler loyalists, and fomenting labor unrest to agitate
for a more total revolution.320 Simply gaining power was not enough; the NSBO
desired to see German society reforged along Strasserite corporatist lines, and
the NSBO was not alone in opposition to the perceived slow pace of Hitler’s
revolution. The SA, led by their charismatic Chief of Staff Ernst Röhm, publicly
despised Hitler’s policy of legality and called for an immediate, “second
revolution” to sweep away bourgeois society.321 Although not a Strasserite
organization in a formal sense, the SA shared the NSBO’s opposition to
bourgeoise society, frequently involved itself in labor unrest, called for the
nationalization of industry, and felt the party establishment around Hitler had
betrayed the party’s revolutionary ambitions.322 Moreover, just like the NSBO, the
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SA possessed an open recruitment policy that brought many socialist and excommunist recruits into its ranks.323 In short, the NSBO and SA could not be
completely synchronized with Hitler’s plans, and they represented an alternative
version of National Socialism that disrupted the Führer’s control.
Hitler responded to the joint challenge of the NSBO and SA labor unrest
by initiating a nationwide purge of the two organizations over the following
months. Although the SA’s leadership remained too strong to confront directly,
SA personnel across the country were expelled and some entire units were
disbanded. The NSBO was purged more thoroughly, and its most senior ranks
were directly targeted. The NSBO’s leading Strasserites were either ousted from
their positions or, in the case of, Reinhold Muchow, murdered under suspicious
circumstances during the purge.324 Once NSBO leadership was decapitated, it
was up to Ley to fashion something compatible with Hitler’s worldview out of the
corpse.

The Deutsche Arbeitsfront
and the Completion of Munich-Strasserite Synthesis
Ley synchronized the efforts of the NSBO with Hitler’s worldview by
rearticulating the organization’s Strasserite corporatism in terms of Munich’s
concept of the völkisch state. The result was a racial-nationalist corporatist
super-organization in the form of the DAF, which presided over virtually every
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aspect of civilian life in the pre-World War Two Reich. Instead of five pillars
representing different aspects of German economic life, there would only be one
pillar for all ethnic Germans, regardless of profession or class origin. Class
divisions between Germans were due to be dissolved, at least rhetorically, but
non-ethnic Germans were excluded from the socio-economic fabric of society
entirely. The DAF’s operation was based on an ascending hierarchy of führers,
each exercising nearly unlimited authority over their subordinates, from the
lowest betriebsführer on the factory floor to Robert Ley himself. Armed with the
personal blessing of Hitler, Ley set about to use the myriad of departments and
organizations designed by Strasser to absorb civil society into a corporatist state
structure to gradually envelope German society in the DAF’s organizational
maw.325 In this endeavor, he was largely successful; by 1939, the DAF
encompassed 87% of the German workforce and possessed an annual income
three times higher than the NSDAP itself.326 Among DAF’s myriad of assets were
banks, insurance companies, newspapers, supermarkets, cruise ships, thinktanks, and state industries such as Volkswagen.327 At all levels of this
gargantuan super-organization, DAF representatives were empowered to
requisition labor friendly renovations or policies as well as extensive punitive
powers to persecute workers or industrialists who were ideologically
uncommitted to National Socialism. Both citizens and private industry would be
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compelled to articulate their demands through the umbrella of the DAF. Although
expansive, the DAF’s reach was somewhat circumscribed by Hitler’s autarkic
economic ambitions. The DAF was free to enforce its will on all manner of civilian
industries, but Hitler actively shielded the private armaments industries due to
their centrality to his re-armament and expansion ambitions. Instead of being fully
subjected to the DAF, the armaments industries were synchronized with the
regime’s plans through a traditional system of informal intimidation and economic
incentives.328
Despite the exclusion of the armaments industries from the DAF’s
umbrella, the organization still possessed sweeping power over civil and
economic life in the Third Reich. In the DAF, the Nazis possessed an institution
designed to quietly re-engineer society in the image of National Socialism.329 The
DAF wielded the carrot of material benefits in the form of low-interest loans,
cheap consumer goods, subsidized vacations, and improved labor conditions
that Ley argued were “the most concise formula for introducing the broad masses
to National Socialism.”330 In this regard, he was absolutely correct. Over the next
six years the DAF showered Germany’s workers in material benefits to ensure
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their loyalty to the regime while it also wielded the stick of constant state
surveillance and demanded uncompromising ideological devotion to the Nazi
party.331 By synthesizing the structures and concepts of Strasserite corporatism
with the racial nationalism of the völkisch state, Ley created the crown jewel of
Nazi social control; a social engineering apparatus of nearly unparalleled scope.

The Night of the Long Knives
and the Consolidation of Hitler’s Hegemony: 1934
The decapitation of the NSBO removed the weaker of two internal
challengers to Hitler’s hegemony over the party. The SA’s autonomous
leadership and 4.5 million members, on the other hand, remained a force to be
reckoned with.332 Whereas the NSBO had been an auxiliary organization, despite
its disproportionate impact on the Reich’s subsequent social structure, the SA
was a different creature entirely. During the first year in power the SA’s reign of
terror enabled the party to conquer Germany through the unrestrained murder,
torture, and intimidation of perceived rivals. After the regime began to solidify in
early 1934, the SA’s penchant for revolutionary violence became a liability. On
the national stage, the public grew wary of the SA’s unchecked violence, and the
Nazi’s reactionary partners and the military prevailed upon President Hindenburg
to pressure Hitler to reign in the SA. The possibility of a counter-revolution
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against the Nazis led by the military and backed by the president was not off the
table.333 As long as Hitler needed the SA to conquer the state, he did not care
about the repercussions of their actions; but once the regime was established,
the SA’s lawlessness courted disaster.
In addition to the threat of the SA sparking a direct confrontation with the
military and president, the organization challenged Hitler from within the party.
The SA itself was an ideologically heterogeneous organization that was strongly
characterized by socialist elements, including numerous ex-communists, national
bolshevists, and social democrats who often mixed their socialist beliefs with the
Nazis’ racial nationalism.334 Due to its massive size the SA lacked a unitary
ideology, but its leadership around Röhm did espouse a series of guiding
demands around which the organization’s calls for a ‘second revolution’ revolved.
First and foremost, Röhm categorically rejected the supremacy of the party’s
political leadership, including Hitler, over the SA.335 This dynamic alone called
Hitler’s leading position into question, but this challenge was further complicated
by the SA’s additional demands. Second, Röhm and the SA continued to publicly
advocate a second, more complete revolution. Although the SA’s demands were
ideologically thin compared to the Strasserites in the NSBO, their ambitions were
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still extensive. Röhm’s overarching goal was the destruction of bourgeois society
and its replacement with a form of hyper-militarized right-wing socialism typical of
Spengler’s völkisch adherents.336 To impose these revolutionary concepts on
broader society, Röhm and his confederates demanded the creation of a formal
SA ministry, sweeping power over the nation’s police forces, and civil
administration.337 Above all else, Röhm called for the abolition of the army and its
replacement with a national people’s militia as the core of his proposed hypermilitarized society.338
By January 1934, it was obvious that the tenuous balance between
Röhm’s SA and Hitler could not be maintained for long. The SA’s leadership
eyed Hitler’s burgeoning ties to the traditional army with skepticism and were
incensed by the lack of SA representation in national offices. Likewise, the SA’s
rank and file offered an ideal audience for their leaders’ calls for renewed
revolution. Despite the nation’s improving economic situation on the macroscale,
average SA personnel remained financially insecure and underemployed.339 The
SA was both armed and organized, and Röhm’s own formidable personality cult
largely eclipsed Hitler within its ranks.340 Privately Röhm excoriated both Hitler
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and his policy of legality, while publicly he used the party’s media outlets to call
for a second revolution with or without the participation of the political leadership.
To quote Röhm, the SA would “carry on our struggle. If they [Hitler and his allies]
finally grasp what it is about, with them! If they are not willing, without them! And
if it has to be: against them!”341 It had become readily apparent that Röhm and
his colleagues were willing to turn the SA’s reign of terror against Hitler if they
deemed it necessary. Röhm saw himself as serving a National Socialist
revolution, not as serving the person of Hitler. As long as Röhm lived, he
presented a potential competitor for leadership of National Socialism.
Despite the looming struggle between the SA and Hitler, Röhm’s powerful
position made him a difficult target to simply dismiss. During the spring of 1934,
Hitler ordered the SS and Gestapo to begin secretly gathering incriminating
evidence against Röhm but he refrained from taking direct action.342 In classic
Hitler style, he would let the situation simmer until he took decisive action only
after events left him no other choice. While the SS and Gestapo worked in secret
to investigate Röhm, relations between the SA, Hitler, and the regime’s
temporary reactionary allies continued to disintegrate. The SA’s growing
weapons stockpiles, revolutionary aspirations, and openly antagonistic rhetoric
towards the army was pushing the state towards crisis. In response, the army
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made it readily apparent that the SA’s plans for a people’s militia or any kind of
SA state would be a red line that would precipitate an immediate military
confrontation with the Nazi regime. Moreover, Hitler was aware that his
expansionist agenda required a fully professional, modern army, not a fanatical
people’s militia. The SA’s proposed militia state did not serve his interests.343 In
an effort to stabilize the worsening situation, Hitler sought to buy time by
compelling the army and SA to sign an agreement specifically delineating their
distinct roles. The army would serve as the sole bearers of arms in the Reich,
while the SA would patrol the borders, provide pre-military training, and serve at
the pleasure of the party’s political arm.344
This episode served to only further harden Röhm’s opposition to Hitler. In
his mind, the agreement was a final confirmation that Hitler had ‘deserted’ the
movement’s revolutionary aspirations. To quote Röhm, “What that ridiculous
corporal says means nothing to me…Hitler is a traitor and at the very least must
go on leave.”345 The break between the two men was inevitable, and unlike
Gregor Strasser, it seemed unlikely that Röhm would be content with quietly
slipping away into retirement. Röhm and Hitler’s dueling conceptions of National
Socialism were incompatible, and a showdown between them was inevitable. All
that remained was to see exactly how their confrontation would unfold and who
would emerge victorious.
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As events unfolded the spark that ignited this powder keg came from
neither Hitler nor Röhm but the from the army. On June 7, 1934, Röhm sent the
SA on leave for a month to rest and recuperate for the first time since the Nazis
rose to power. What precisely the SA would do upon returning from their period
of rest remained entirely unclear, but the army was not inclined to sit idly by and
wait. On June 22, the army issued an ultimatum to Hitler demanding that the SA
be brought under control, and its talk of a second revolution terminated
permanently. Failure to comply would precipitate a military coup backed by the
ailing President Hindenburg. At the same time, after a year of inaction, the
reactionaries surrounding Vice Chancellor Papen finally found a spine and were
organizing against the regime in opposition to the SA’s revolutionary rhetoric.346
Hitler’s inaction regarding Röhm had delivered the Nazis to a singularly
remarkable crisis and at the time it was entirely unclear how the events of June
might unfold. If Hitler did nothing, then every likely outcome worked against him.
If the army’s coup succeeded, Hitler would likely be deposed in favor of a Papen
government backed by President Hindenburg. If the coup was inconclusive, then
a SA-Army civil war could see Hitler marginalized. Finally, if the coup failed and
the SA initiated its own second revolution Röhm could emerge as the new
leading figure in National Socialism. Hitler had backed himself into a corner. His
only viable option was to act ruthlessly and decisively to purge the SA.
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The planning for what subsequently came to be known as the Night of the
Long Knives was hastily organized. After months of investigating Röhm on June
25, the SS produced a dossier detailing numerous alleged treasons. The dossier
claimed that a SA Putsch was imminent, and that Röhm was conspiring with
Gregor Strasser, General Schleicher, and the French government to topple the
Nazi regime.347 The allegations of Strasser’s involvement were dubious and the
charges of a French connection were completely fabricated.348 Although,
considering Röhm’s previous rhetoric, the possibility that some form of action or
provocation had at least been discussed in senior SA circles was credible. In
truth, Hitler cared little for the veracity of the document. He simply required a
justification to initiate a purge against the SA. Over the following days, arms were
secretly transferred from the army to the SS for the purposes of executing a
purge and party officials issued a series of public condemnations of second
revolution rhetoric. Finally, Hitler ordered Röhm to convene a retreat of SA
leadership at the Bad Wiessee in Bavaria on June 30 and announced his
intention to address the assembled SA officers personally. Röhm did as
instructed, and the trap was complete.
Mere hours before the purge was due to commence, a troop of threethousand disgruntled SA personnel took to the streets of Munich bellowing “The
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Führer is against us; the Army is against us. SA men, out into the streets!”349
Upon hearing of the march, Hitler, who had arrived in Munich to personally lead
the purge, flew into a fit of hysteric rage, and ordered the two ranking SA officers
in Munich executed on the spot. He subsequently launched the raid on Bad
Wiessee ahead of schedule without waiting for SS reinforcements. Thus, began
the final action in Hitler’s effort to assert total control over the party. The SA’s
senior leadership were summarily rounded up and executed. After initial
hesitation Hitler decided that Röhm posed too great a threat to be left alive and
ordered him executed as well.350 Likewise, Gregor Strasser was dragged out of
retirement, arrested and killed. In one fell swoop the SA was incapacitated and
the phantom of a Strasserite resurgence that so troubled Hitler was eliminated
completely. There was no longer a source of internal dissent or room for
alternative perspectives within the Nazi party; Hitler emerged from the Night of
the Long Knives as the uncontested master of National Socialism.

Conclusion
In addition to achieving its primary goal of purging the SA and eliminating
Gregor Strasser, the Night of the Long Knives also terminated organized
reactionary and conservative opposition to the Nazis. Papen’s inner circle was
purged and Papen himself was placed under house arrest. General Schleicher
was murdered. Conservative ministers were arrested or executed, and the last
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prominent Catholic politicians were killed.351 After the Night of the Long Knives,
the Third Reich became indistinguishable from the Nazi party, and the Nazi party
was inseparable from Hitler.352
The elimination of Röhm, the senior leadership of the SA, and Gregor
Strasser marked the point at which Hitler’s variant of National Socialism became
fully institutionalized. There was no longer any force within the party or its
immediate orbit that could challenge him or present an alternative ideological
pole. The Reich was carved up between a plethora of oligarchs great and small,
but all of them were bound to a single central tenant – to serve Hitler and make
his ideas a reality. Paradoxically, Nazism initially thinned as a result of Hitler’s
acquisition of ideological hegemony due to the total elimination of the socialist
and Strasserite variants of the movement. But it would be a mistake to declare
the Night of the Long Knives the end of Nazi ideological development. The
formative years of National Socialism were over, but its ideological thickening
was not. Hitler’s dominance marked the beginning of a new ideological paradigm
centered on the pursuit of his core ideas. Nazi ideology was now inseparable
from Hitler and no variant of National Socialism that was not rooted in Hitler’s
concepts was deemed acceptable. Instead, his lieutenants created their own
variants of Hitler’s National Socialism and thickened it by adding their own
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elements. Hitler had not ended the thickening of National Socialism; he defined
himself as the ideology’s new baseline.
What began as just another unremarkable populist movement born amidst
the chaos of the early Weimar era in 1919 had completed its development as a
totalitarian party devoted to executing and elaborating the whims of one man. But
this process was not simple. Over the course of the party’s development, Hitler’s
hegemony over National Socialism had been far from guaranteed. Despite his
successful efforts to bind the party to his will, Hitler was never the sole architect
of its ideology. After its populist inception, under the tutelage of the Munich wing
National Socialism developed inchoate socialist and strongly racial nationalist
themes that culminated in a racial conception of governance in the völkisch state.
Hitler was obsessed with racial purity, but it was the concept of the völkisch state
that allowed these obsessions to achieve tangible form. As Munich proved
incapable of leading the movement on the national stage, the onus of ideological
development shifted to the Strasserites, who thickened the party’s socialist ideas
and merged them with corporatist structures. Hitler’s oratory talents were
considerable, but it was the Strasserite party organization that allowed the Nazis
to extend their tendrils to every corner of Germany. Moreover, it was Strasserite
institutions re-imagined along völkisch lines by Robert Ley, that came to envelop
every aspect of socio-economic life in Germany under the party’s umbrella.
Given Hitler’s notorious disdain for organizational affairs, it is nearly impossible to
envision how a Nazi state could have been constructed or perpetuated without
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the ideological and structural contributions of Munich and the Strasserites.
Likewise, without Hitler, the Nazis would likely have never risen above the myriad
of other völkisch populist parties.
Ideological development is never a purely theoretical or structural process.
Ideologies are created and thickened by individuals, and National Socialism was
no exception. The development of Nazism was not guided by irreversible
historical processes; it was driven by the ideological variations of powerful
individuals in the movement and the numerous conflicts between them. The
ultimate outcome of these internal conflicts was that Hitler was able to
marginalize or eliminate his rivals and institutionalize his personal variant of
National Socialism, but this result was never guaranteed. Hitler did not create
Nazi ideology alone. Much like the leader of a messianic religious cult, he
cultivated the idea of himself as the image or spirit of National Socialism and in
so doing, he came to define and personify the ideology in a way that no other
architect ever could. This dynamic was key to binding both the ideology and
surviving Nazi ideologues to himself. Once the party gained power, his fanatical
adherents attempted to pursue their interpretations of his vision without requiring
specific instructions. From that moment on, Hitler’s lieutenants branched out
across Germany like dark apostles, intent on re-engineering every aspect of
society in the service of his whims. The concepts and structures created by
Munich, and the Strasserites became the arsenal with which to accomplish this
goal. Those who failed to fall into line behind their twisted messiah or espoused
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alternative perspectives of National Socialism were ostracized and annihilated. In
the Third Reich, there would be room only for Hitler and those ideologues who
adhered to variants of his vision. In the Nazis’ dogmatic pursuit of their master’s
will they marched blindly into the greatest calamity in their nation’s history.
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